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ALIJA IZETBEGOVIĆ

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I HERCEGOVINI**

**WAR AND PEACE
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Izdavač:

Vijeće Kongresa bošnjačkih intelektualaca

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UVODNA NAPOMENA

Izlaganje predsjedavajućeg Predsjedništva Bosne i Hercegovine, g. Alije izetbegovića na Tribini VKBI 29.11.1997. godine, imalo je u vidu širok dijapazon pitanja, koja su mu u svojim pismima i obraćanjima postavljali građani, zainteresirani, prije svega, za budućnost Bosne i Hercegovine, ali i za druga brojna pitanja i probleme. Ovo je, zaista, bila prilika da se dobiju i odgovori od kompetentne ličnosti, prvog sudionika istorijskih događanja na ovim prostorima posljednjih godina. Nastup gospodina Izetbegovića na Tribini pobudio je izuzetno zanimanje javnosti, što pokazuje i veliki broj posjetilaca, koji su ispunili dvije najveće dvorane Doma Armije u Sarajevu, pa je za ovu priliku video tehnika Obala ART Centra omogućila prenos slike i tona u drugu salu.

Riječ je o ratu i miru u Bosni i Hercegovini, kao temi koja zaokuplja pažnju ne samo domaće, nego i svjetske javnosti. Kako je došlo do rata, da li je bilo moguće izbjeći ga, spriječiti krvoproliće i masovnu nesreću? Kako je postignut mir, šta nam donosi takav mir prepun kompromisa i ustupaka, da li je on moguć poslije genocida i agresije? Koja je najlošija strana Dejtonskog ugovora, a koja najbolja? Dejtonski dokumenat, izraz je vremena i prilika u kojim smo se tada nalazili i ako se bude dosljedno proveo, bio bi to povoljan ugovor, naglasio je g. Izetbegović. I pored svih nedaća koje imamo, njegov je zaključak optimističan: "Mi imamo najbolju djecu na svijetu, mi imamo najbolje vojnike na svijetu. Generacija o kojoj govorim rađa i raste koncem 20. vijeka, i to za vrijeme i nakon strašnog rata. Ta djeca su prošla kroz džehenem, ona su upoznala glad i umiranje i gledala smrti u oči. Ta djeca su naš veliki adut za budućnost, moramo voditi računa o njima."

Dio izlaganja o medjima izazvao je polemiku i neslaganje u apostrofiranim časopisima. Rekli bismo da je i to dio napora u demokratizaciji bosanskohercegovačkog društva i podizanju odgovornosti za javnu riječ.

Arif Zulić

RAT I MIR U BOSNI I HERCEGOVINI

Dame i gospodo, dragi prijatelji, prije svega želim da vam se zahvalim na ovako velikoj posjeti. Osjećam to kao vaše priznanje i podršku za mene.

Ovo neće biti klasično predavanje. Ono je nastalo u stvari iz mog pokušaja da odgovorim na jedan broj pitanja iz pisama koje sam dobivao. Naime, od kako sam došao na ovu funkciju dobio sam hiljade pisama građana. Ja sam pregledao ova koja sam dobivao u posljednje vrijeme i odlučio da odgovorim na neka pitanja koja po mom mišljenju imaju opći značaj, koja se ne odnose na neki pojedinačni ili lokalni problem. Tema - rat i mir u Bosni - malo je pretenciozna, kao što vidite, naravno, ja niti pretendujem niti mislim da je moguće u nekih 40-45 minuta, koliko imam na raspolaganju, iole analitičnije odgovoriti na tako složen problem. Ja ću pokušati da dadnem neka zapažanja o tome, neka svoja zapažanja, mislim da ću iznijeti neke stvari, možda do sada nepoznate, pokazati onu, što kažemo, nevidljivu stranu mjeseca. Ono što se nije vidjelo i o čemu je javnost manje upoznata.

Prije nego što predjem na odgovore, mogao bih da učinim jedno zapažanje koje će vam možda biti interesantno. Prvo, listajući pisma, zapazio sam ogromnu različitost, jedno, da kažem, šarenilo pitanja, koje odražava različitost naših pogleda i veliko interesovanje ljudi. Bilo je tu čak i pitanja o španskom građanskom ratu pa do, recimo, ovog najnovijeg feljtona o Titu. Neko me pitao šta mislim o tom feljtonu, da li je korektno što se to piše itd.itd. Naravno, dominirala su pitanja koja se tiču naše realnosti, naše sadašnjice, a posebno, ova o kojima ću danas govoriti. Kako je došlo do rata u Bosni, zatim kako je zaključen mir i zašto je ovakav kakav jest. Onda, dalje, bilo je posebno u posljednje vrijeme, mnogo pitanja o zločinima, koje je učinila bosanska Armija, odnosno koje su učinili vojnici bosanske Armije, pa zatim pitanje medija. Mnogo sam pisama

dobio o tome kako pišu mediji o različitim problemima u Bosni, kako to oni predstavljaju. Dalje, često je bilo, recimo pitanje, kako i zašto vjerujem da će se Bosna održati. Vjerujete li i, ako vjerujete, zašto vjerujete da će se Bosna održati. Dalje, ko su glavni saveznici Bosne, a bilo je i jedno pitanje, to pismo sam jučer dobio, kad ćete već da govorite, da li ćete učiniti nekakve poruke itd.

Naveo bih još jednu karakteristiku, koja bi bila interesantna, koja odražava stanje duha u zemlji, a to je da veliki broj pisama, ustvari skoro polovina, potiče od žena, zanimljiva činjenica koja pokazuje interesovanje žena za društvene i političke probleme u zemlji.

Ići ću redom.

Prva grupa pitanja, rekao sam, odnosi se na stanje neposredno pred rat u Bosni. Prije svega, na tri stvari, raspad Jugoslavije, odnosno uvjeti pod kojima je došlo do raspada Jugoslavije, zatim izbori, 1990. i sastavljanje prve vlade.

Bile su tu neke polemike, a i vi se vjerovatno sjećate nedavnih polemika pred TV ekranima, o tome kako je došlo do raspada Jugoslavije. Želim da kažem ovdje, da vas podsjetim na to da mi nismo radili na razbijanju Jugoslavije. To nije bio naš cilj. Iz svega se vidi jedna miroljubiva politika naše vlasti, miroljubiva politika od početka jugoslovenske krize, pa sve do najnovijih dana. Meni se, inače, prigovara za onu parolu: pregovarati, gdje god možemo, ratovati ako moramo. Ja se ne odričem te devize, ja sam to zaista govorio i to ne jedanput nego u više mahova. Pokušali smo, dakle, da očuvamo Jugoslaviju, ali da je pri tome rekonstruiramo. Ako prelistate tadašnju štampu, možete vidjeti one naše grdne napore koji su trajali u toku čitave 1991. godine. Jedan plan, ako se sjećate, nosi Gligorovljevo i moje ime, kojim je pokušano da se dodje do jedne konfederalne Jugoslavije, zapravo Jugoslavije koja bi garantovala slobodu i ravnopravnost naroda. Pokazalo se da se Jugoslavija, na kraju krajeva, nije mogla spasiti, jer nije mogla da riješi dva glavna problema. Naime, ona nije mogla da riješi problem slobode, nije mogla da se odrekne komunističkog nasljedja i, drugo, nije

mogla da se odrekne hegemonije, srpske hegemonije. To su dvije boljke od kojih je Jugoslavija bolovala i zbog kojih je nestala sa istorijske scene. Pokazalo se da je to bila jedna nepopravljiva struktura uprkos svih naših napora koje smo činili. Spominjem ove naše napore jer, iako oni nisu uspjeli, treba da se zna za njih, jer oni pokazuju da smo mi bili vrlo odgovorni ljudi. Mi smo znali da rušenje Jugoslavije može da ugrozi Bosnu i Hercegovinu i, posebno, bošnjački narod u njoj. S druge strane, bošnjačkog naroda je bilo i s one strane Drine, i dalje prema jugu, a bilo ga je u Zagrebu dosta, i tako dalje. Naš je interes bio da očuvamo tu zemlju, naravno ne pod svim uvjetima nego pod uvjetima, da se osiguraju sloboda i ravnopravnost naroda. Nažalost, Srbi su svako spominjanje ravnopravnosti doživljavali kao uvredu. To nije uspjelo i kad nešto u istoriji prodje nemamo šta da žalimo. Uvijek se sjetim one Hegelove izreke: sve što je u istoriji propalo, propalo je s razlogom. Istorija je nepotkupljiv sudija, i ako je nešto propalo, ono je moralo da propadne. Jugoslavija onakva kakva je bila, nije se mogla spasiti.

Kada je riječ o komunističkom sistemu, on se globalno rušio, nestao je u Sovjetskom Savezu, Rumuniji, Čehoslovačkoj, Poljskoj, Bugarskoj. Dakle, on je doživio, da ta kažem, globalni poraz, tako da ni Jugoslavija kao socijalistička zemlja, iako je bila u izvjesnoj mjeri specifična, nije mogla da opstane.

To je, da kažem, prvi dio mog današnjeg izlaganja, odnosno moj odgovor na pitanje iz jednog od pisama kakav je bio vaš odnos bio prema Jugoslaviji, jer je takvih pitanja bilo mnogo. Ovo što govorim pokriva 1991 i naše napore da se nadje neko rješenje, jer bez toga nam se krov ruši na glavu. U 1991 dolazi do kratkotrajnog rata u Sloveniji, a zatim, dugotrajnijeg i krvavijeg u Hrvatskoj, da bi koncem 1991. godine došlo do definitivnog izdvajanja Slovenije i Hrvatske iz Jugoslavije. Na sceni su Slovenija i Hrvatska, kao nezavisne države, i ostatak Jugoslavije. Bosna i Hercegovina se najjednom nalazi na raskršću. To je taj kritični trenutak. Imaju samo dva puta. Jedan, da Bosna ostane u krnjoj Jugoslaviji sa Srbijom i Crnom Gorom, a drugi da proglasi nezavisnost. Nikakva treća mogućnost nije

postojala. Oba su nosila krajnji rizik. Oba su sadržavala u sebi opasnost za bošnjački narod i Bosnu i Hercegovinu kao državu, oba su nosila opasnost poraza, ustvari, ili moralnog ili fizičkog ili kombinovanog.

Ja rekoh da smo imali izbor između ta dva puta. Ali pitanje je da li je uopće bilo izbora i da li je izbor realno postojao. Da li smo mogli ostati u krnjoj Jugoslaviji? Ja mislim da nismo mogli čak i da je vodstvo bošnjačkog naroda to odlučilo, ja mislim da bi to bila odluka koja se ne bi mogla izvršiti. Bošnjački narod je odbijao krnju Jugoslaviju. Ja se sjećam, kada sam u toku onog ljeta, u onim maloprije spominjanim pokušajima da se Jugoslavija rekonstruira, u jednom momentu spomenuo da bi Bosna i Hercegovina možda mogla u budućoj Jugoslaviji, zbog vojnog problema, zadržati nešto specifičniji oblik bliže veze sa Srbijom, kako se tada digla prava buna u narodu. Napisali čak tamo na jednom mjestu, ja se bojim da to i danas stoji, Alija - Srbin. Nije se dakle moglo pomisliti o tome da mi ostanemo sa samim Srbima i Crnogorcima u krnjoj Jugoslaviji i narod je najvjerovatnije na neki način instinktivno osjećao šta bi to značilo. A pošto u istoriji nema eksperimenata, danas možemo samo nagadjati šta bi to značilo. To nas vjerovatno ne bi spasilo od rata. JNA bi tada odlučila da se bori za Hrvatsku i Sloveniju, rat bi se nastavio, jer bi Srbi povjerovali da mogu sačuvati Jugoslaviju u kojoj bi JNA za dugo bila vrijeme glavni arbitar. Nas bi vjerovatno mobilisali da se borimo, za očuvanje takve Jugoslavije. Naši momci bi ginuli na hrvatskim ratištima i vjerovatno albanskim. Bili bi pozivani da ugušujemo nekakve pobune koje bi se pojavljivale u vezi sa tim. Dakle, nisam siguran da bismo se spasili velikih nevolja i da smo se odlučili za krnju Jugoslaviju.

Podsjetio bih vas da je čitavo vrijeme naša parola u toku krize bila: "Prihvatamo svaku Jugoslaviju u kojoj su istovremeno i Hrvatska i Srbija, ne prihvatamo nikakvu Jugoslaviju, u kojoj nema jedne ili druge". Istupanjem Hrvatske iz Jugoslavije, taj uvjet više nije bio ispunjen. Mi smo dakle morali ići ka nezavisnosti. Nismo se, također, zavaravali da će objava

nezavisnosti proći bez problema, ali izbora nije bilo. Znali smo za naoružavanje Srba širom Bosne i Hercegovine koje se već vršilo, znali smo koliko mi oružja imamo. Imali smo malo. Po nekim najoptimalnijim proračunima, u trenutku proglašenja nezavisnosti imali smo možda dvadeset hiljada pušaka uračunavajući i rezervnu policiju, koju smo mobilisali, Patriotsku ligu, Zelene beretke, a prema sebi u Bosni i Hercegovini smo imali osam korpusa Jugoslovenske armije koji su brojali 75 hiljada do zuba naoružanih ljudi, uključujući tenkove, avione, itd. Nije bilo davno, svi se sjećate tog vakt, sjećate se Sarajeva u maju 1992. godine. Ali držim da izbora nije bilo, i sad ima nekih kritičara, pametnjakovića, ne znam kako bih ih nazvao, koji kažu da nije trebalo da proglasimo nezavisnost. Tada ostaje jedino da idemo u krnju Jugoslaviju. Nikada to niko nije otvoreno rekao, jer bi to bilo teško braniti. Razgovarao sam sa mnogim opozicionarima i kada ih upitam, dobro, jeste da je proglašenje nezavisnosti nosilo rizik, ali šta smo trebali uraditi, nikada mi nisu odgovorili smisleno i jasno na to pitanje. Istina - Bog, na moje veliko iznenađenje, jedan naš intelektualac, ne znam da li je član ovog Vijeća ili nije, jedan stari čovjek - 80 mu je godina, pa mu se možda može odbiti i na matuhluk, je'l, rekao je nedavno da smo trebali ostati u krnjoj Jugoslaviji, da bi nam to bilo dobro, da smo mi rat započeli itd., dakle, rekao sve ono što otprilike amnestira i Karadžića i Miloševića. Rekao je mnogo drugih stvari, imao sam, da vam kažem iskreno, utisak da mu je sam šejtan na ramenu i da mu šapće šta će kazati, jer su to bile sve gore i nevjerovatnije stvari. Bio sam, pravo da vam kažem šokiran, ali ja mogu tom piscu odati priznanje, iako se apsolutno ne slažem s njime, makar je bio iskren i rekao konačno - pa da, trebali smo ostati u krnjoj Jugoslaviji. To niko ranije nije htio da prevali preko jezika, jer se zna šta to znači, jer narod otprilike sluti šta bi se događalo da smo slučajno to učinili. Pogledajte danas šta se događa u Jugoslaviji. Crna Gora - gdje se mnogi ljudi osjećaju Srbima, koji ljudi dijele istu vjeru, pa ako hoćete i sličnu kulturu, nalazi se u apsolutno podređenom položaju

prema Srbiji. Kod Srba postoji neki mentalitet nadmoći, neko pogrešno osjećanje da su oni narod misije, da su oni najjači narod. Oni hoće da su okosnica svake države na ovim prostorima i mislim da kod njih postoji neka urodjena nesposobnost za ravnopravnost drugih naroda. Ovakvu situaciju vidite kod Crnogoraca i to kod njih koji su stvarali federaciju sa Jugoslavijom. Sad možete pretpostaviti kakav bi bio položaj Muslimana, ili kako oni rado kažu, Turaka, odnosno istorijskih ostataka koje treba odavde očistiti, koji su po njima destabilizirajući faktor na Balkanu - riječ je naravno o bosanskim Muslimanima itd. Možete pretpostaviti šta bi se događalo.

Naravno, to su, je li, pretpostavke. Ono što se kasnije stvarno dogodilo - to je rat. Moram priznati, iako sam slutio rat, nekom prilikom sam rekao - rata neće biti, pa mi to stalno prebacuju, ali taj moj odgovor, koji je upravo bio takav, išao je na to da umiri narod kod kojega je sa razlogom već vladala panika. Naša odbrana ne zavisi od toga - da li sam ja narodu rekao da li će rata biti ili neće, jer u tom momentu izjava te vrste mogla bi samo da ubrza nesreću, nego od toga šta sam činio da se osigura odbrana. A činili smo jako mnogo, koliko god smo u onim uvjetima mogli. Formirali smo Nacionalno vijeće odbrane i Patriotsku ligu, pokušavali smo naoružati narod, koliko je to bilo moguće. Moram, također, priznati da nisam očekivao genocid. Nakon 40 godina one vlasti i onoga šta je ta vlast čitavo vrijeme govorila, a govorila je o bratstvu i jedinstvu. govorila je o ravnopravnosti, a naročito o ovome drugom. Stoga nisam očekivao da će Jugoslovenska armija prihvatiti da se pretvori u srpsku armiju i to u vrlo kratkom roku. Najednom je skinula sa sebe neku odoru - ispod toga se pokazala čista srpska armija. Ja sam u samo predvečerje rata letio u Skoplje ili na Ohrid, danas se tačno ne sjećam, znam da je tamo bio Gligovor, da se vidim sa generalom Adžićem. Rekao sam mu: dajte, imenujte nekoliko muslimanskih generala koji će biti komandanti u Bosni i Hercegovini.. Uradite to ako hoćete da spašavamo zemlju. On mi je sasvim otvoreno rekao da to nije moguće. "Pa, znate, kaže Adžić, Armija je srpska u svojoj

ogromnoj većini. Nezamislivo je da joj komandanti budu muslimanski generali. Moram vam to reći, gospodine Izetbegoviću". To je tako bilo. Mislim da se ta izjava može naći u "Oslobodjenju". Otuda i moje pitanje kritičarima: šta smo trebali u toj situaciji uraditi? Želio bih čuti njihov odgovor.

Drugo pitanje iz pisama tiče se onih izbora iz 1990 godine, stvaranju prve vlade itd...i sad ima ovakve priče: SDA 1990. stvara koalicionu vladu sa SDS-om i HDZ-om, a to nije bilo dobro. To je dovelo do raspada zemlje, itd.

Ovdje se treba vratiti sedam godina natrag, na kraj 1990. Dogadjaju se prvi višestranački izbori u zemlji. Stranke pobjednice se znaju: šta mi u toj situaciji treba da uradimo. Nemamo većinu u Skupštini, pa i da imamo većinu, da li smo trebali da preglasavamo nekoga tamo. Oni kažu niste trebali stupiti u koaliciju sa SDS-om. Može biti. Samo se postavlja pitanje šta bi se dogodilo? Dogodio bi se rat, kao što se i dogodio, samo što bi SDS sada imala argument, vrlo jasan argument. Ovi Bošnjaci stvaraju manjinsku vladu, ignoriraju volju srpskog naroda, srpski narod neće u takvoj Bosni da živi, oni hoće da nas zajašu, mi moramo da se branimo, i tako dalje. Da smo napravili samo vladu sa HDZ-om, tada bi bilo - stvorila se nova NDH-zija, nekakav hrvatsko-bošnjački savez protiv Srba, itd. i jedno jedino logično rješenje je bilo da pokušamo da stvorimo zajedničku vladu sa strankama kojima su Srbi i Hrvati dali glasove. To je jedino što smo mogli uraditi i to smo uradili. Na moje pitanje koje sam često postavljao u razgovorima sa opozicijom, šta smo to drugo trebali uraditi, nisu mi nikad znali odgovoriti, jer drugog odgovora i nema. Samo sa strankama koje su u onom momentu očigledno predstavljale srpski, odnosno hrvatski narod, mogli smo da obrazujemo zajedničku vladu i na taj način pokušamo, na osnovu rezultata izbora, spasiti Bosnu i Hercegovinu. Tad se činilo da je to prava formula i ona bi i bila da SDS nije bio ono što je u suštini bio, da je bio ono čime se proklamirao na svom osnivačkom kongresu koji je ovdje održan u Sarajevu. SDS se pokazao kasnije kao šovinistička sila, kao eksponent planova Velike Srbije i, kao što

znate, osjetio je da može, jer je bivša Armija prešla na njegovu stranu. SDS je tada odlučio da ostvari taj plan o Velikoj Srbiji, da bude faktor ostvarenja tog plana i krenuo je na razbijanje Bosne. Bosna je priznata 6. aprila 1991., a rat je počeo uoči tog dana, 5. aprila popodne, bombardovanjem Sarajeva, čim se saznalo za odluku o priznanju Bosne i Hercegovine. Jer, očigledno, oni su iz diplomatskih izvora saznali da sutra ujutro predstoji formalno priznanje Bosne i krenuli su u napad. Dakle, to su moji odgovori na naš odnos prema Jugoslaviji, našu situaciju, naše proglašenje nezavisnosti, zašto je do njega došlo i zašto smo napravili koalicionu vladu sa SDS i HDZ. Ja sam spreman da odgovorim i na neka vaša pitanja, ako ih bude u tom smislu.

Dobio sam veliku grupu pitanja koja se odnose na mir, i sa naglaskom na to zašto je mir takav kakav jest. Rekao sam maloprije da smo pregovarali skoro čitavo vrijeme rata, tragajući za mirom. Neki mi prigovaraju zbog spremnosti na pregovore. Ali, ja ću odgovoriti: jeste, mi smo pregovarali, ali smo istovremeno jačali našu odbranu. Imam za to, naravno, i vrlo jasan dokaz - to je naša Armija. Mi smo čitavo vrijeme, pregovarajući sve do Dejtonskog ugovora, jačali našu vojsku. Na kraju, kad je Dejtonski ugovor zaključen, mi smo imali preko 200 hiljada ljudi, nisu baš svi bili naoružani, imali smo između 100 i 120 hiljada pušaka, ali pošto su se vojnici smjenjivali na frontu, ostavljajući pušku kad bi išli kući, praktički je na frontu bilo sve naoružano. Imali smo dakle oko 120 hiljada pušaka i imali smo preko 2300 artiljerijskih oruđa, tačan broj tenkova vam ne znam reći, ali i njih smo imali, kao i jedan broj helikoptera. Uporedo sa pregovorima, mi smo jačali našu odbranu i to je rezultiralo s tom armijom koja u onom momentu predstavljala snagu koja se morala uvažavati na Balkanu. Tako smo stvorili ono što se zove čudo bosanskog otpora, što nije nikakva retorička figura, nego realnost. Vjerujem da je upravo ta Armija učinila da konačno Bosna i naš narod postanu faktor bez koga se više nikada ništa neće moći riješiti u ovom regionu. Zahvaljujući tome što smo stvorili tu armiju, ja sam bio jedan

od potpisnika onog Dejtonskog ugovora. Sjetite se one slike iz Dejtona: Milošević-Izetbegović-Tuđman. Ne neko drugi. Inače ne bi nas niko ništa pitao, odlučili bi se bez nas. Oni su morali priznati da postoji taj faktor koji se zove Bosna, Bosanci, bosanska armija i zahvaljujući po prvi puta praktički u istoriji u posljednjih nekoliko vijekova, Bosanci direktno odlučuju o svojoj sudbini. Da li smo na najbolji način odlučili, i da li smo mogli drugačije odlučiti, o tome ću vam iznijeti neke činjenice, pa ćete moći sami prosuditi.

Dakle, zašto sam pregovarao, tako me pita pisac jednog pisma. - Pa, zato što sam smatrao da je naša politička pozicija, da su naši politički aduti u svakom trenutku rata bili jači od naših vojnih aduta. Naši pravni, moralni i politički aduti bili su snažni i zato ih je trebalo upotrijebiti, ne izostaviti ih.

Dejtonski mir je jedan opširan ali nedorečen dokument, izraz vremena i prilika u kojima smo se tada nalazili, u kojima se možda i danas nalazimo. Rekao bih ipak da glavni nedostatak nije sam tekst ugovora. Pretpostavimo da se taj ugovor dosljedno provede. Da li bi to bio povoljan ugovor za nas? Ja mislim da bi. Ono što ne valja je što se on nedosljedno i sporo provodi. Iako postoji izvjestan progres u pogledu vraćanja izbjeglica, ključni Aneks 7 se ne ostvaruje, a on je upravo bio naš glavni motiv da zaključimo Dejtonski ugovor. Naša glavna nada za Bosnu vezana je za Aneks 7. Mi smo tražili, a oni su prihvatili i svijet je prihvatio i potpisao da će se izbjeglice vratiti kućama. Ako se izbjeglice vrate svojim kućama, onda to nije ona Bosna kakvu su oni zamišljali, mislim na srpsku stranu u Bosni, nego je to ponovo jedna mješovita, multietnička Bosna. I nije to onda tamo Republika Srpska, jer kad bi se vratili Bošnjaci i Hrvati u Republiku Srpsku, skoro pola stanovništva bi činili nesrbi u njoj. Mi i dalje vjerujemo i radimo na tome da se ljudi vrate, ako ne svi, ali svakako većina njih i biće to novi faktor u toj Republici Srpskoj. Dakle, Bosna će nastavljati da postoji.

Jedno pitanje je glasilo: gospodine predsjedniče, šta je, po Vama, najbolja strana u Dejtonskom ugovoru, a šta je najlošija? - Ja bih mogao da odgovorim: najbolji je član 1. Dejtonskog

Ustava Bosne i Hercegovine u kome se doslovno kaže: "Bosna i Hercegovina nastavlja svoje pravno postojanje kao međunarodno priznata država pod nazivom Bosna i Hercegovina, sa svim pravima države i u svojim međunarodno priznatim granicama". To je ključna odredba i prvi i najvažniji član Ustava Bosne i Hercegovine, odnosno Aneksa IV Dejtonskog ugovora. Najveća manjkavost Dejtonskog ugovora je mogućnost blokade institucija, i to se jako osjeća svih ovih dana. Ovo dobro i zlo u tom Ugovoru vode tihi rat i sudbina Bosne zavisi od ishoda tog nečujnog, ali opasnog rata.

Šta lično mislim o Dejtonskom ugovoru, to sam rekao odmah nakon što sam ga parafirao u Dejtonu 21. decembra 1995. Dobro se sjećam završnog dijela tog kratkog govora. On je doslovno glasio: "Ovo nije pravedan mir, ali je pravedniji od nastavka rata. U situaciji kakva jest, u svijetu kakav jest, bolji se mir nije mogao postići: Bog nam je svjedok da smo učinili sve što je bilo u našoj moći da nepravda za našu zemlju i naš narod bude manja" - To sam rekao. Isto mislim i danas o tom Ugovoru. Kad sam se vratio u Sarajevo, novinarima sam odmah kazao da je glavna manjkavnost Ugovora mogućnost blokade. Sve to ima u tadašnjim glasilima. To je opasnost da institucije, zajedničke institucije, kroz koje država vrši svoje funkcije, budu blokirane.

A sad zašto je Ugovor takav kakav jest, ja ću vam ispričati četiri-pet događaja koji su manje-više nepoznati, a koji mogu pomoći da se djelimično odgovori na to pitanje. Ja ću o njima pričati onako kako ih se sjećam.

Pregovori o miru koji su doveli do potpisivanja Dejtonskog ugovora nisu počeli 1. novembra 1995. i trajali 20 dana, kako se to obično misli. Oni su stvarno počeli 12. augusta 1995., dolaskom Holbruka ovdje. Moj prvi razgovor, nakon onih uvodnih pozdrava, bio je ovakav: on mi je saopštio da dolazi sa punim ovlašćenjima predsjednika Klintona i da će Amerika sprovesti ovaj ugovor ako do njega dodje. Bilo je tačno mjesec dana nakon srebreničke tragedije. Ja sam rekao da smo mi spremni na pravičan mir. A zatim je slijedilo njegovo jasno

pitanje, citiram po sjećanju: "Molim Vas, da bih počeo svoju misiju, morate mi reći: imate izbor između dvije mogućnosti, između dvije opcije. Hoćete li cjelovitu ali decentralizovanu državu ili hoćete vlastitu bošnjačku državu koja će biti čvrsta i jaka, ali samo na dijelu sadašnje BiH? - Tako je glasilo pitanje. Ja sam skoro bez predomišljanja rekao: "Ono prvo". Dakle, cjelovitu, pa makar bila i nešto labava i decentralizovana država. Shvatio sam da se cjelovita i centralizovana država ne može dobiti. Ali moj odgovor je upravo tako glasio gospodinu Holbruku na dan 12. augusta 1995. Tako je počeo razgovor. Možda bi bilo dobro da vam odmah ispričam i kraj, to jest kako su se pregovori u Dejtonu završili skoro četiri mjeseca kasnije, 20. odnosno 21. novembra 1995. Možda i to ilustruje i situaciju i atmosferu koja je vladala. Poslije natezanja koja su trajala danima, u kojima pregovaraju tri strane, pa kad nešto dogovorite s jednom stranom, ona druga strana ne prihvata i tako dalje, ostalo je neriješeno Brčko, i neki višak teritorije koji smo mi, prema mapama, još uvijek imali. Milošević je rekao da nikakav ugovor koji ne respektuje plan Kontakt grupe o rasporedu teritorije na odnos 49:51, neće prihvatiti. Pošto je ovaj odnos bio uvjet svih pregovora i bio je opće prihvaćen, mi nismo naravno mogli ovaj zahtjev odbiti. Napominjem da smo mi svi, pa i naša Skupština prije toga, prihvatili plan Kontakt grupe kao osnov za pregovore. 20. novembra skoro pred samu ponoć, dolazi državni sekretar Kristofer u moju sobu, neće da sjedne, kaže da nemamo vremena, da smo u vremenskom tjesnacu, i dodaje: "Morate Srbima vratiti jedan i po posto teritorije koje imate preko kvote od 51% i morate im vratiti Brčko". Zatražio je odgovor u roku od jednog sata. Pozdravio se i otišao. Ja sam rekao dvojici ljudi, Šaćirbegoviću i Čukleu, da pokušaju da nadju tih jedan i po posto, ali tako da vratimo neke teritorije koje mi vojno ne držimo. Oni su se mučili i, uzimajući kao domaćica koja čopa tijesto sa strana po jedan komadić tu i tamo, i nabrali su jedan posto, ali onih 0,50 nisu nikako mogli da nađu, jer bi inače morali uzimati od teritorija koje je već držala naša vojska i koje smo mi svaki put krvavo

osvojili. Što se tiče Brčkog, to naravno nismo mogli prihvatiti. Ja sam poslao Šaćirbegovića da ode u njihov štab, on je bio u nekoj susjednoj zgradi, i odnese odgovor, koji je glasio: evo vam natrag jedan posto teritorije, a Brčko ne damo. Pola sata nakon toga došao je u moju sobu Kristoferov sekretar, i donio mi na potpis pismo u kome stoji da su pregovori propali, da se završavaju. Bilo je to u noći 20. na 21. novembar 1995, malo prije ili malo poslije ponoći. Ja sam to pročitao, potpisao i, pravo da vam kažem, po prvi puta u zadnjih pet - šest dana mirno otišao na spavanje i zaspao tvrdim snom. Čudno je to, moram reći: uvijek sam se bolje osjećao kad sam nešto odbijao nego kad sam nešto prihvatao. Javnost je lakše primala kad nešto odbijete, nego kad ste nešto prihvatili, iako je jedino produktivno bilo prihvatanje. Taj NJET-sistem, tako ga mi u žargonu zovemo, koji je inače dosta udomaćen, jer je to uvijek najlakše, obično ne vodi ničemu. Ono što se uradilo stvorilo se nekim pozitivnim stavom. Ali ovaj put mi smo zaista bili došli do granice onoga šta se moglo učiniti za mir. Nisam se mogao vratiti narodu sa viješću da je Brčko predato. Rat se, nažalost, nastavlja, ali se takav mir nije mogao prihvatiti. Dao sam instrukcije da se spremimo za put sutra 21. novembra u 9 sati. Medjutim, sutra oko osam sati došao je predstavnik Kristoferov i rekao da bi ovaj želio da dodje do mene. Ja sam rekao da može odmah da dodje. Dogadjalo se očito nešto čudno. Šaćirbegović mi je prije toga javio da začudo u toku noći nije bilo nikakvih vijesti o prekidu pregovora, što bi bilo normalno, jer je bilo uobičajeno da glasnogovornik Bijele kuće ili Državnog sekretarijata svaka dva-tri sata obavještava šta se događa. Medjutim, čitavu noć o neuspjehu pregovora nije bilo nikakvih vijesti. Meni će biti tek kasnije jasno zašto. Kristofer je došao u društvu Holbruka. Odbio je da sjedne i sa vrata je rekao: "Pristajete li na arbitražu za Brčko". Ja sam bez predomišljanja odgovorio: "Da", jer sam to ranije nudio pošto sam vidio da pregovori mogu zbog Brčkog propasti. Pa, govorio sam, ako smo ovdje riješili toliko stvari, zašto zbog tog jedog neriješenog pitanja moramo nastaviti rat. Hajde da to ostavimo

za sada, možda ćemo kasnije biti pametniji i tako dalje. Prema tome, ponudio sam arbitražu negdje otprilike već iza 10. novembra. Medjutim, Srbi su odbijali. Milošević je vjerovao da može da dobije Brčko ako bude dobro zapeo. I bio je zapeo. Kad je vidio da smo potpisali prekid pregovora, predomislio se. Mogu da pretpostavim šta se tamo događalo u toku noći: njemu je prezentirano da su pregovori propali, da je on kriv za prekid pregovora, zbog upornosti oko Brčkog, onda su se sjetili te ideje o arbitraži i ponudili je. Kada sam ja rekao da prihvatam, a Holbruk je klimnuo glavom i nešto poluglasno rekao Kristoferu i oni su istog momenta izašli. Kasnije sam iz nekih Holbrukovih izjava vidio da mu je u onom momentu rekao: "Bježimo odavde". Valjda su se bojali da ću ja kazati - da, prihvatam arbitražu, i onda ono: ali, mada ja to nisam imao namjeru da kažem. Bježimo, dakle, odavde. Kroz sat-dva javljeno je da su pregovori uspješno okončani i da se mir zaključuje. Predsjednik Klinton je izašao pred Bijelu kuću i objavio da je postignut dogovor o miru, da rata u Bosni više neće biti, da pred Bosnom stoji nova budućnost, itd. Mi smo parafirali taj ugovor negdje u rano poslije podne po američkom vremenu, odnosno negdje kasno naveče po našem.

Ima još jedna zgoda koja može da osvjetli pitanje o kojem je riječ. U augustu 1995., putem Francuske ambasade, dobio sam od predsjednika Širaka poziv da 29. augusta dodjem u zvaničnu posjetu Francuskoj. Krenuo sam 27. naveče i prenoćio u Mostaru, s tim da sutra iz Jablanice u 12 sati poletim helikopterom za Split, a odatle za Francusku. Upravo kada sam se spremao, bilo je to 28. augusta nešto iza 11 sati, javljeno mi je da je pala granata na Markale, da je poginulo 50-60 ljudi i da ima mnogo ranjenih, i ja sam odlučio da se vratim u Sarajevo. Mislio sam kakvog smisla ima ići bilo gdje ako se sve ovo sve događa i nema nikakve reakcije, a s obzirom na loše iskustvo, pravo da vam kažem, nisam očekivao nikakvu reakciju. Smatrao sam da će to ponovo proći samo na osudama koje ništa ne znače i bio sam odlučio da otkažem put. U našoj delegaciji bio je, pored ostalih, i Safa Oručević. Safa me ubjedjivao da ipak

idemo i objasnimo svijetu šta se radi. Ne vrijedi vratiti se u Sarajevo i plakati. Sa velikim zakašnjenjem stigli smo u Francusku, oni su nas tamo čekali od tri popodne, a mi smo došli negdje u sumrak. Sutradan sam imao razgovor sa predsjednikom Širakom. I, naravno, prvo što sam pokrenuo bilo je pitanje reakcije na jučerašnji masakr. On mi kaže vrlo jasno: Molim vas, gospodine Izetbegoviću, imate moje DA za to. Francuska je za intervenciju u ovom slučaju. Francuska ima potpuno jasan stav. Amerikanci se malo kolebaju, pritisnite njih. Tako je baš glasio njegov odgovor. Ali, ima tu još jedna okolnost. Čim sam došao u Pariz, Holbruk mi javlja da je i on u Parizu i da želi da razgovaramo. Ja sam odgovorio da od pregovora o miru više nema ništa, s obzirom na događaje na Markalama i s obzirom na ovu Širakovu izjavu da se Amerikanci kolebaju. On me ponovo pozvao popodne, ja sam ponovo odbio susret. Bio je to 29. august 1995. Naveče sam imao sastanak u nekom francuskom klubu, gdje sam govorio za jednu grupu njihovih intelektualaca. Kada se sastanak završio, ja sam se vratio u hotel i trebali smo sutradan da putujemo natrag. Pošto je počela da pada kiša, predložio sam da se obučemo sportski i da idemo malo prošetati. I mi smo izašli van, bilo je negdje oko 10 sati navečer. Oko pola jedanaest neki se ljudi stanili oko nas, kažu da su iz Američke ambasade i da mene i moje kolege američka ambasadorica zove na večeru u Američku ambasadu. To je bila gospodja Hariman, jedna divna, otmjena gospodja, veliki prijatelj Bosne, udovica poznatog američkog diplomate Averela Harimana. Ja sam znao od prilike da se radi o nastavku pregovora koje ja nisam nikako htio više da nastavljam. Rekao sam da ja, nažalost, ne mogu da dodjem na večeru, a nisam ni obučen za tu priliku i da se najljepše zahvaljujem. A onda je ovaj čovjek dodao: gđa ambasadorica ima za vas i jednu vrlo važnu vijest. Ja sam onda, naravno, promijenio odluku. Krenuli smo prema ambasadi i ušli u dvorište. Na vratima rezidencije čekala nas je gđa Hariman i pozdravila nas ljubazno. Uvela nas je u jedan veliki salon, veći od ove sobe, a u desnom uglu sjedio je Holbruk za telefonom i nešto razgovarao. Onda je meni dao

znak da dodjem, pokazujući mi telefonsku slušalicu, želi neko da razgovara sa mnom. S one strane javio se pomoćnik državnog sekretara Kristofera, gospodin Talbot. Rekao mi je približno slijedeće: "Znam da imate dilema oko ovih pregovora, ali Vam predlažem da nastavite razgovor sa g. Holbrukom, a akcija će uslijediti". - Kakva akcija? - upitao sam. Do sada je bilo nekoliko akcija, vi se sigurno sjećate da smo imali ono bombardovanje nekakvog starog tenka. G. Talbot odgovara: "Ovog puta će biti ozbiljna masovna akcija". - "A kad će to biti" - pitam. Veli: "To ni ja tačno ne znam, ali znam da će uslijediti vrlo skoro. "Dobro, rekoh, ja ću nastaviti pregovarati, na vašu riječ. A onda je on meni dodao još onu ključnu rečenicu, zbog koje vam čitavu ovu zgodu pričam: "Samo, gospodine Izetbegoviću, nek znate, ovo što će uslijediti nećete moći upotrijebiti za nastavak rata, možete iskoristiti samo za mir, ne za nastavak rata". Ja sam rekao da se ja slažem s tim. Drugačiji moj odgovor nije mogao ni očekivati, ali ta rečenica je kasnije često ponavljana u toku pregovora, zajedno sa onom Holbrukovom o decentralizovanoj državi. Mi smo tada večerali i vratili se u hotel negdje iza jedan sat poslije ponoći. Ja sam legao spavati sa tom mišlju da će prava akcija konačno uslijediti. A, onda, sutra rano ujutro, oko šest sati, zalupali su kod mene na vrata i neuobičajeno glasno govore: "Predsjedniče, jutros je akcija tamo, masovno bombardovanje srpskih položaja oko Sarajeva i oko Tuzle i tako dalje". Bilo je to 30. augusta ujutro. S obzirom na onaj razgovor koji sam imao sa predsjednikom Širakom, odlučio sam da ga posjetim na 15 minuta i da mu se zahvalim, jer sam znao da i on ima svoje zasluge u tome. Zatražio sam posjetu i on me odmah primio. Ovo spominjem zato što tu ima jedan interesantan detalj. Kad smo izlazili iz Širakove rezidencije, čekala nas je napolju velika grupa novinara. Predsjednik Širak mi tada kaže: "Novinari čekaju vaš komentar o ovom bombardovanju. Ja vas molim da ne dadnete neku ratobornu izjavu, molim vas da dadnete neku izjavu koja govori o miru i tako dalje". Ja sam izašao van i rekao ovako novinarima: "Ovo su bombe za mir, nisu za rat...ovo su bombe za mir". Kad smo

se pozdravljali on je rekao da je to bila prava izjava, i tako dalje, ali hoću da kažem da sve ovo što je bilo preduzeto nije moglo biti upotrijebljeno za nastavak rata i to je ono što objašnjava zašto mi u oktobru 1995. nismo nastavili one ofanzive. Ima i tu još nekoliko značajnih detalja. Mi smo 10. septembra probili front kod Vozuče i spojili Drugi i Treći korpus. Krenuli smo snažno da napredujemo u Krajini, onda je došlo do njihove kontraofanzive kod Ključa i naš je front bio na trenutak gore poljuljan. 5. oktobra 1995. zaključeno je primirje, ali mi smo nastavili da napredujemo i 6, 7, 8. oktobra. Tada mi dolazi prvo upozorenje od Amerikanaca, potpisali ste, nastavljate da ratujete, ne smijete nastavljati da ratujete, itd. Mi, naravno, nastojimo da oslobodimo Prijedor, a ako je moguće i Bosanski Novi, ali nam to ne polazi za rukom. 11. Ili 12. oktobra dolazi kod mene američki ambasador i kaže: "Ako se ne zaustavi daljnja akcija, ovaj puta će se bombardovanje okrenuti protiv vas,. Mi ćemo bombardovati vaše trupe, vaše snage". Vidio sam da je đavo odnio šalu, pa sam poslao generala Delića gore u Krajinu da Dudakoviću objasni situaciju. On je otputovao u Krajinu i zaustavio borbe. To se moralo, ali mislim da smo u posljednji čas uspjeli da oslobodimo Sanski most. Bilo je to 11. Ili 12. oktobra.

Možda bi trebao da navedem još jednu važnu okolnost koja je snažno uticala na pregovore. To je izjava predsjednika Klintona od 5. novembra 1995., u prvim danima pregovora, kada je rekao da će Amerika, ako se zaključi mir, vojno učestvovati u njegovoj implementaciji. Naravno da je to bila vrlo značajna izjava koja nas je podsticala da na svaki način tražimo rješenje, jer je on tada izjavio i slijedeće: "Ovo je posljednja šansa, ako propadne, Amerika će se povući iz svega". U toku pregovora u više mahova nam je rečeno da je ovo posljednja šansa i da ne bi trebalo da je propustimo. Kao što znate, mi je nismo propustili i ne treba da se kajemo. Mi smo mali narod, a umiranja je bilo previše. Ja sam ovom prilikom pokušao da vam kažem neke stvari da biste bolje razumjeli

našu situaciju. Ja vjerujem da će Bosna opstati, a kako i zašto vjerujem, ja ću nešto više o tome kasnije reći.

Slijedeća grupa pitanja koja sam ovih dana dobio, odnosi se na zločine koji se pripisuju bosanskoj armiji. Prvo da kažem - zločina je, nažalost, bilo, ali koliko, neko će se ljutiti na tu riječ - koliko. Zločin je zločin, ubijen jedan čovjek ili ubijeno hiljadu ljudi. Pa, i Kur'an kaže, da vas podsjetim, jedna od najuzvišenijih njegovih rečenica glasi: "Ko ubije jednog čovjeka, kao da je pobio čitav svijet". To izričito kaže Kur'an i ne kaže slučajno: to je poruka da, kad je riječ o zločinu, brojanja nema. Da, u vjerskom i moralnom smislu brojanja nema, naravno, ali, u političkom i praktičnom smislu ima. Jer, sa moralnog stanovišta nije važno da li je ubijen jedan čovjek ili je ubijeno 50 ljudi. Sa političkog jeste, veoma je važno. Zašto? - Pokušaću da to objasnim. Postavlja se opravdano pitanje, kad su se već dogodile stvari koje su za svaku osudu, je li to bila politika našeg civilnog i vojnog rukovodstva. Vi svi dobro znate da to nije bilanaša politika, ali to svijet ne mora vjerovati. E, taj broj dešifruje, je li to bila politika ili su bili incidentni slučajevi. Ako je u toku skoro četvorogodišnjeg rata ubijeno 100 civila, onda to mogu biti incidentni slučajevi, ako je ubijeno 10 hiljada ljudi, onda je to plan. Naravno, istraga će reći svoje, istraga je u toku. Nažalost, istraga je bila zaustavljena kad je riječ o Grabovici, dok ovi magazini nisu to pokrenuli, to je istina i utoliko oni su bili u pravu, nezavisno od toga što su kasnije prešli granicu objektivnosti. Način na koji to danas tretiraju, po mom mišljenju, nije objektivna, a nije baš ni patriotski. Prema onome što se može saznati iz različitih dokumenata i zapisnika, vojnici naše armije mogli bi imati do sto ljudi ukupno na svojoj duši, kad se sve sabere, zločini u Kazanima, u Grabovici, u onome tunelu Čelebići i možda nad Hrvatima kod Bugojna, ali ovo posljednje je još nedokazana stvar, a kad se to sve sabere, to je stotinu ljudi, i to je stotinu puta manje od onoga što se učinilo bošnjačkom narodu, neko tvrdi i hiljadu puta. Mi smo imali front dugačak hiljadu dvjesta kilometara i na tom frontu hiljadu dvije stotine dana rata. Pomnožite te dvije cifre, pa ćete vidjeti

kakav je napor bio potreban da se zločini na tako dugačkoj liniji i u tako dugom vremenu spriječe. To je moglo samo biti rezultat jednog zaista ispravnog stava politike i vrhova vojske o tom pitanju. Svaki naš vojnik imao je kodeks u kome je pisalo šta se ne smije raditi, u kome stoje izvodi iz međunarodnih konvencija, mislim da ćete se sjetiti da smo u svim prilikama pozivali ljude da paze šta rade, da nije naše da civile progonimo i tako dalje. Odgajani su bili u tom duhu, i u tome smo uspjeli, ali nažalost, ne u cijelosti, i ne na svim mjestima. Ovdje u Sarajevu smo imali slučaj, kao što znate, da su se odmetle neke jedinice. Neki od vas sa boljim pamćenjem sjetit će se situacije u gradu u julu 1993, kada su neke jedinice napale policiju, zarobile jedan broj policajaca, i tako dalje. Hoću da naglasim da nam nije niko, i to odgovorno izjavljujem, u to vrijeme rekao da u Sarajevu postoje zločini. U današnjim novinama, ja nisam imao vremena da to pročitam, ali rekoše mi, da je general Divjak izjavio kako mi je poslao pismo u kome se spominju Kazani. Ja to pismo imam i u njemu se ne spominju ni Kazani ni genocidna ubistva. Spominju se maltretiranja ljudi, pa i neka ubistva, ali se jasno vidi da to nije bilo samo prema Srbima, nego i prema Bošnjacima i Hrvatima, jer ima imena i jednih i drugih i trećih. Dakle, istina je da su maltretirani ljudi od strane nekih naših vojnika ili jedinica, ali nije se radilo o genocidu. Bilo je ubistava iz koristoljublja, vrlo često iz osвете, ali žrtve su bile različitih nacija i to je vjerovatno motivisalo sud da to ne okvalifikuje kao ratni zločin, kao genocid, nego kao ubistva. Zašto su tako odlučivale, naravno, sudije će dati svoju riječ. Sudije su žive, tužilac je živ, istražni organi takodjer, svi su tu na okupu i moći će kazati svoj sud o tome. Koliko znam, tužilac je bio Srbin, kao i jedan član sudskog vijeća. Ali, ono što je ovdje važno, mi smo preduzeli akciju da spriječimo dalju samovolju. Moram reći, sa izvjesnim osjećanjem ponosa, da je prvi ko se oglasio vrlo jasno da treba nešto hitno preduzeti, jer se događaju ružne stvari, da je to bio Izvršni odbor SDA. To saopćenje je dato sa sjednice od 23. oktobra 1993. i doslovno glasi: "Polazeći od obaveza i odgovornosti koje Stranka demokratske akcije ima u

jačanju odbrambenih sposobnosti naroda Bosne i Hercegovine i razmatrajući tekuću vojnu i sigurnosnu situaciju u Sarajevu, Izvršni odbor SDA konstatuje da je u nekim jedinicama Prvog korpusa Armije BiH već duže vrijeme ozbiljno narušen sistem rukovodjenja i komandovanja, čime se izravno dovodi u pitanje efikasnost izvršavanja borbenih zadataka i slabe naponi Armije BiH i naroda u njihovoj teškoj borbi protiv agresora. Pojave kriminala i samovolje medju pripadnicima oružanih formacija takodjer su uzele maha. Pojedinci u nekim jedinicama u Sarajevu svojim nezakonitim postupcima i ponašanjem ruše ugled koji su ove jedinice stekle u herojskoj odbrani grada. Zbog toga Izvršni odbor SDA zahtijeva od organa vlasti, prije svega od Predsjedništva BiH i Štaba Vrhovne komande Armije BiH, da razmotre ovu situaciju i preduzmu mjere na zavodjenju reda i poštovanju zakona i time povrate poljuljano povjerenje građana u njihovu vojsku i državu. Samo organizovana i dobro sinhronizovana borba može biti uspješna, a rat i ratno stanje ne mogu biti izgovor za samovolju i bezakonje". Tako je glasio puni tekst ovog važnog dokumenta.

Saopćenje je objavljeno na TV dnevniku 23. oktobra 1995. i u "Oslobodjenju" od 24. oktobra. Vojno-policijska akcija je uslijedila 26. oktobra u jutranjim satima i trajala je čitav dan skoro do ponoći. Topalović je ubijen kao što znate u toj akciji, uhapšeno je par stotina ljudi, prošli su kroz zatvor i kroz istrage, veći broj je oslobođen, jer nije bilo dokaza da su oni činili nasilje, ali svi koji su bili sumnjivi bili su tada uhapšeni, osudjeni su oni za koje su postojali dokazi. Da li su kazne blage ili nisu i da li je kvalifikacija trebala da bude drugačija, nije moje da sudim, ali hoću da kažem da smo mi u izglednjelom, napaćenom i granatiranom Sarajevu smogli snage da preduzmemo tako rizičnu akciju. Deseta brigada, čiji je komandant bio Mušan Topalović-Caco, držala je linije gore na Trebeviću od Čoline kape do Vrbanje mosta. Vrlo kritičnu liniju i vrlo blisku gradu. Moram naročito da naglasim da je svako demoniziranje ove jedinice kao cjeline nedopustiva stvar. Jer istraga je pokazala da su u zločin bili umiješani samo Caco i

jedan broj njegovih bliskih saradnika. Danas imamo stalno prozivanje 10. brdske u kojoj se nalazilo dvije do tri hiljade vrlo časnih boraca. Kad je uslijedila akcija 26. oktobra niko od njih nije napustio liniju. Svi su ostali na svojim mjestima. Nedopustivo je da se danas, ko god je bio u 10. brigadi, smatra sumnjivim i suodgovornim. A toga ima. Pitam se: je li to uvođenje kolektivne odgovornosti za ljude. Odgovornost je individualna i ne može se kazati zato što su Srbi ubijali, da su svi Srbi zločinci. Odgovorni su pojedini ljudi koji su to uradili. Ne može se to uraditi ni sa čitavim jedinicama. Ne može se kazati da je 10. brigada kriminalna brigada. 10. brigada je časno branila ovaj grad pune 3 godine i dala mnogo šehida. I na koncu, pokazala se na visini kada je došlo do obračuna. U svakom slučaju kada je riječ o ovom pitanju, istraga radi svoj posao, a bezbeli i Haški sud. Haški tribunal će, kao i do sada, imati našu punu saradnju.

Nažalost, nema rata bez zločina, ma ko da ga je vodio: Nijemci protiv Francuza, Amerikanci protiv Vijetnamaca, Drugi svjetski rat bio je pun zločina. Ne možete sve kontrolirati. Ponekad ne možete kontrolirati jer je u jedinicama bilo i ljudi koji su imali kriminalne dosjee. Neki od njih su se kasnije vrlo čestito i disciplinovano borili za Bosnu i Hercegovinu. To su oni koji su se na neki način oprali, vratili se normalnom životu. Ali, ima ljudi koji su tad iskoristili priliku, naoružani i uhranjeni počeli su da prave nasilje. Imalo je, naravno, i nenormalnih ljudi, i to se događa, jer stanje nije bilo normalno, a prijem u vojsku, u onim prilikama, odvijao se stihijski, bez neophodnih liječničkih i drugih procedura.

Prelazim na slijedeće pitanje.

Mnogo sam pisama dobio o medijima, mnogi se ljute na medije kako izvještavaju baš o ovim zločinima, i uopće o situaciji u Bosni i Hercegovini. Moram priznati da u pismima nema značajnih prigovora na TV kuće, na TV BiH, na Hajat, na OBN. Ima prigovora na Pale i na zapadni Mostar, i to dosta često. Nema prigovora ni na novine, mislim na dnevnike, i lično mislim da dnevници u ovom gradu korektno obavljaju svoj posao.

Ali, ne bih to mogao reći za ovdašnje magazine koji su počeli da se utrkuju, da uveličavaju crne strane u ovom društvu i naročito, kada je riječ o ovim zločinima, da to potenciraju, da traže i izmamljuju izjave da se kaže sve gore i gore. Prije svega, znam da su mnoge izjave netačne, a s druge strane zar ne primjećujete da se radi o jednoj kampanji koje je uspjela da potpuno zasjeni četničke zločine. Ko više govori o Karadžiću, Mladiću, Srebrenici. Sad se govori o Kazanima. Njih se ne tiče što Bosna i Hercegovina gubi ugled, zaslužen ugled. Jer, ako je bilo nešto svijetla i zakonitosti, bilo je to ovdje. Medjutim, iz pisanja tih medija se, mogu dobiti sasvim drugačiji utisci. Više niko ne govori o četničkim zločinima, sad smo u najmanju ruku jednaki, ako nismo čak i gori. Jer se kod četničkih zločina ne navode detalji, oni monstruozi detalji koji uzbudjuju ljude. Kod nas se navode i to često potpuno izmišljeni. Pored toga, kod nas se ne navode nemoguće i neprovjerene cifre. Njima treba vijest, a da je Karadžić zločinac to više nije vijest. Da su četnici izvršili zločine nije više vijest. Vijest jest da je bosanska Armija izvršila zločine, pa sad o tome treba pisati. Znaite ono: nije vijest ako javite da je pas ujeo čovjeka, nego ako je čovjek ujeo psa. Što se tiče medija, mene ljudi pitaju, ja ne znam šta da odgovorim. Ima ljutih pisama u kojima se kaže da su to neprijatelji, da oni rade za pare. Mnogi kažu da imaju dokaze da neki novinari to rade za novac, da znaju ko prima pare za to i ko je spreman napisati najgori članak protiv BiH za hiljadu maraka. To mi ljudi kažu. Ne znam šta je tu tačno, ali moram priznati, da jednu kampanju osjeća svako ko nije gluh i slijep. Osjeća se jasna kampanja protiv bosanske vlasti, protiv bosanske armije i želja da se pod svaku cijenu okalja vlast. Želi se prikazati da je sve crno i tako dalje. Stalno se spominje bijeda, kriminal, bezakonje, borba za vlast i tako dalje i tako dalje. Samo su to karakteristike bosanskog stanja po nekim časopisima, ničeg pozitivnog. Ja ću vam pročitati doslovno neke bisere iz tih članaka. Ti magazini su sami sebe nazvali nezavisnim, ali moj je utisak, možda ću biti malo grub, ne mislim ni da su nezavisni ni da su profesionalni. Naime, oni misle da se nezavisnost sastoji

u stalnom napadu na vlast. A kada je riječ o njihovom profesionalizmu, ne bih rekao da su profesionalni, jer krše dva temeljna pravila profesije, a to je čuti i drugu stranu i provjeriti. Oni to ne rade. Objave sirovu vijest bez provjere, ili pišu, jedan čovjek to kaže, u čaršiji se priča to i to, jedan dužnosnik koji nije htio da kaže ime rekao je to i to. I tako se plasiraju neprovjerene priče. Niko od njih ne ode da pita, evo, čuli smo to i to, gospodine, kako stoje stvari. Niko od njih nije otišao da čuje tužioce, sudije, istražitelje, pa da saznaju šta se stvarno dogodilo u tim nesretnim Kazanima, jer o tome postoje dokumenti. I sad te priče o korupciji, ustvari o finansiranju nekih institucija. Mi nalazimo načina da finansiramo AID, ja to ne krijem. Mi nećemo da ostanemo bez te službe, koja na koncu konaca kontroliše ko dolazi u grad, ko se gdje kreće, ko šta radi, jer nam je to neophodno u situaciji kad su granice porozne i kada svako može ući u grad. Mi smo čuli bombe koje su eksplodirale. Nismo čuli one koje nisu a mogle su eksplodirati. To je AID spriječio. Mi, hvala Bogu, imamo danas miran grad. Neko taj mir čuva.

A sad evo nekih "bisera" koje sam spomenuo. U jednom članku piše doslovno: "Ništa se na ovim prostorima ne događa slučajno, pogotovo i prije svega, nije slučajno što nema države, pa onda logično nema ni policije i pravde, i što je tako kako je, tako nam je kako je. Kriminalci i teroristi rade to što rade, jer ih je ovakva država svjesno proizvela i prepustila na ove prostore da služe kao obezbjedjenje velikim i krupnim lopovima, da štite tal u privatnom državnom lopovluku. Oni su doveli ubice u ovu zemlju, da njih i njihov lopovluk čuvaju...itd." Evo, tako doslovno piše u jednom nedavno objavljenom članku. Dakle, ova vlast je dovela ubice u ovu zemlju da čuvaju njihov lopovluk. Nema države, nema policije, samo lopovi, ubice i pljačkaši. To se servira narodu. Države je, hvala Bogu, bilo i u najteže doba. Sjećam se Sarajeva 1993. godine, u jeku rata. Sestra mi stanuje u Velešićima, i vraćao bi se nekad sa sijela kasno noću, a stanovao sam kod bolnice gore. Susretao sam žene kako same idu u jedanaest i dvanaest sati navečer. Nije

zapamćen slučaj da su bile napadnute. Bile su to obično sestre - bolničarke koje idu na smjene negdje u jedanaest sati, jedne odlaze, druge dolaze, susretao sam ih bez muške pratnje. Žure kući ili idu na posao. Osvijetle ih farovi, a u gradu je bio potpuni mrak. Nije se dogodilo da budu napadnute, dakle, bilo je države i reda. Ja to poručujem piscu ovog članka. On očito ne zna šta znači nemati države. On uopće nije svjestan šta priča. A kad je riječ o općoj društvenoj i ekonomskoj situaciji, koju ovaj i slični boje samo crnim bojama, podsjetio bih da smo mi vratili 400 hiljada izbjeglica, dakle 400 hiljada ljudi vratili svojim domovima u posljednje dvije godine i smjestili ih. Od toga 200 hiljada su bila raseljena lica koja su bila napustila svoje domove unutar Bosne i Hercegovine i otprilike isto toliko došlo je spolja. Dok su oni oštrili pera i pisali, mi smo radili. Dok su oni izmišljali laži, mi smo trebali da riješimo penzije za 190 hiljada penzionera. Mi smo doveli struju u svako selo u BiH, kao i telefone i televiziju. Mi smo popravili kuće, našli plate za sve profesore i ljekare u državi. Vi znate da plata nije bilo, a danas profesori i ljekari mogu da žive od te plate, istina, skromno, ali mogu da žive. Penzioneri nemaju velike penzije, ja to znam, ali penzionera ima 190 hiljada, a uz to 70 hiljada invalida i 42 hiljade korisnika šehidske penzije. Ta sredstva je trebalo osigurati bez štampanja novca, pa nema inflacije. Sve smo škole popravili za ove dvije godine i sve bolnice. Oni to ništa ne vide, vide svugdje samo lopovluk, pljačku, kriminal, terorizam i tako dalje, i u to ubjedjuju narod. To je za njih realnost Bosne. Ali, to nije realnost Bosne, to je laž o Bosni. Zlonamjerna laž koja demoralizuje ljude i ruši ugled ove zemlje. Njihove napuhane i ponavljane priče o korupciji kada je riječ o vanjskim donacijama koštale su ovu zemlju 200 do 300 miliona dolara, jer naravno, čim se čuje o korupciji, onda oni koji daju pare sve zaustave. Zašto bi davali pare lopovima. "Neću ja i moja mama da dajemo pare, kako je rekao ambasador Kraford, da bi došle u džepove nekih lopova u Bosni". Vi znate da sam ja formirao komisiju i da ova nije još uvijek našla nikakve dokaze o pronevjeri donacija. To ne znači da nema lopovluka druge vrste, naravno

da ima, ali u kojoj ga zemlji nema. Samo smrt i lopovluk su nepobjedivi.

Ovih dana pokrenuta je inicijativa da svi iz rukovodstva, i svi koji nešto odlučuju daju izjave o svom imovinskom stanju. Ja mislim da je to dobra ideja i to svi treba da učinimo. Treba javno da kažemo šta smo imali prije rata, šta imamo danas, da to potpišemo, pa ako se pokaže da smo lagali, da snosimo moralne i pravne posljedice. Ja držim da će veliki broj ljudi moći pošteno da odgovori na to pitanje.

1946. godine sam zbog politike osuđen na tri godine zatvora i izašao u proljeće 1949. Kraj zatvora dočekaao sam gore u jednom logoru na mađarskoj granici. Jedan zatvorenik, isto tako politički zatvorenik, siromah neki čovjek, radio je kao kondukter u tramvaju i porodica mu je živjela u Sarajevu, zamolio me da mu ponesem ženi pismo. Objasnio mi je da žena radi u nekoj piljari u ulici između Carevog mosta i Baščaršije. Odmah sutradan po dolasku kući otišao sam da potražim ženu. Našao sam je u jednoj od prodavnica i, dok je ona čitala pismo, ja sam razgledao radnju. U njoj nije bilo ničega osim 5-6 kištri bijele repe. Bilo je hladno, ona i poslovođa bili su umotani u neke deke, jer u radnji nije bilo traga o nekom grijanju. Upitao sam: "Pa, šta vi ovdje prodajete?" - Ovo što vidite, odgovorili su i dodali da ponekad dobiju nešto krompira, ali tu se odmah stvore redovi. Sjećam se dobro, a i neki stariji ovdje među vama, tih dana, mogu reći i tih godina, u Sarajevu nije bilo ničega. Sarajevo je djelovalo bijedno i pusto. Nešto, nedovoljno, brašna, šećera i ulja na bonove i tekstila na tačkice, - bilo je za običan narod, to jest za ogromnu većinu ljudi. Za povlaštene bili su tzv. ministarski magacini. Bilo je tri kategorije ovih magacina. Sestra moje žene radila je kao prodavačica u jednom od njih, koji je nosio naziv "broj 3", tako da situaciju dobro poznajem. U onome "broj 1" snabdijevala se vojna i politička vrhuška i to bez ograničenja. U tim magacinima je bilo svega, od pasteriziranog američkog mlijeka do čokolada svake vrste. A pri tome zatvori puni, uglavnom informbirovaca i Mladih muslimana i ljudi malo

podužeg jezika. Kad su napunili sve zatvore koji su bili ostali iza stare Jugoslavije i ustaša, formirali su dodatni logor na Čengić Vili, - zvao se "logor 505", od nekoliko hiljada ljudi. Sve ovo što vama pričam bilo je 1949. dakle, četiri godine nakon rata, a stanje nije bilo bolje sve tamo do 1952. To je bila ta "lijeva" pravda, socijalna i politička, a neki današnji novinari i opozicionari, duhovni i ideološki nasljednici ove "pravde" ,prigovaraju nama iz dana u dan različite nedostatke i nepravde. Ovih sigurno ima i treba ih otklanjati, ali Sarajevo je prošle godine, samo godinu dana nakon uništavajućeg rata, izgledalo bolje nego 1950, pod komunistima, pet godina nakon onog rata. Do 1966, dakle 21 godinu, vladao je Ranković, a nešto blagostanja i vrlo ograničene slobode, osjećalo se tek 1975-1978. godine, dakle nakon više od 30 godina one vlasti. Ali, i to uz cijenu neslobodne javne riječi i 20 milijardi duga prema inostranstvu.

Da se vratim na te naše medije i njihovu polovinu istine. Navešću samo dva najsvježija primjera. Prvi se odnosi na slučaj Kazana, a drugi na one nesretne dvojne nastavne programe.

Dogodili su se, nažalost, Kazani, ali dogodila se i naša akcija protiv vinovnika ovih zločina. Zločini se ističu, obradjuju u deset varijanti, akcija se prešućuje, kao da je nije bilo. 20 sati trajala je drama u gradu, mi se praktički tučemo sa vlastitim vojnicima, hapsimo štab 10. brigade, svakog časa mogu linije da budu napuštene. Niko o tome ne piše. Ima zločin, ali ima i kazna. Ako se samo o zločinu govori, a ne i o kazni, ako se ona prešućuje, ako se ona krije, onda nešto nije u redu očigledno, onda se govori pola istine. I baš se to radi, kako mi piše pisac jednog pisma. Veli, gospodine predsjedniče, samo pola istine se govori zato što su oni za to pola istine plaćeni, a ne za onu drugu. Oni su dobili pare samo za tu polovinu istine koja blamira vlast.

Ista stvar se ponavlja kod nastavnih programa. Ministar griješi i pod hrvatskim pritiskom prihvata dva programa. Mi to odbacujemo, na inicijativu SDA uslijedila je peticija Kluba Koalicije, u kojoj mi kažemo da mi ne prihvatamo dva

programa, da hoćemo jedan integralni program u kome bi bile poštovane i nacionalne specifičnosti. Bilo je to na Skupštini Federacije, ali kampanja se nastavlja kao da te peticije nema. Usputno: ispitao sam da li je bilo kakvih posljedica one pogrešne ministrove instrukcije i utvrdio da se praktički nije dogodilo ništa. Tamo gdje su bila dva programa prije, ostala su i sada i to jedino gore u onoj čuvenoj "Šator školi" kod Tešnja. Ali, tamo su i prije imali dva programa. Onaj direktor u Šator školi se bio izdvojio zato što nije htio da prihvati bosanski program. Zato je napravio šator, pa su onda hodale one slike po svijetu. Pa se govorilo, evo vidite šta ova bosanska vlast radi, neda ovim ljudima njihov školski program, pa su u šator otišli. Slike su išle i sramotile nas po svijetu. Mi ne možemo da pariramo svakoj propagandi. Kasnije će biti obrnuto. Naš direktor škole, vrati one iz šatora u školu, onda idu slike kako je direktor dozvolio dva nacionalna školska programa. I na moje veliko čudjenje, onaj Bošnjak direktor tamo, umjesto da kaže da to njegov kolega - zamjenik Hrvat traži, i da ne može više gledati djecu da se mrznu u šatoru, jer nisu djeca kriva za to, umjesto da tako kaže, jer je to istina, on kaže, pitajte one gore za ta dva programa, a Hrvat zamjenik to potvrđuje. Ima pravo.

Velika grupa pisama, ovih preda mnom, sadrže u različitim formama pitanje: zašto vjerujem da će se Bosna uprkos svemu održati kao cjelovita država? Moj odgovor je: imam bar pet jakih argumenata za to. Broj jedan je Dejtonski ugovor. Broj dva, jer većina građana u Bosni hoće cjelovitu državu. Sav bošnjački narod, apsolutno hoće to, a on je kičma Bosne, i on neće dozvoliti da se Bosna razori. Treći faktor koji djeluje u tom pravcu je činjenica da većina svijeta hoće Bosnu, ogromna većina. Tu su Amerika, Evropa, islamski svijet, pa i još neke tako važne zemlje, kao što su Japan i Kina. Moram naglasiti da imamo sigurnu podršku i Engleske koju ponekad sumnjiče da igra neku dvostruku ulogu. Ovdje je nedavno bio premijer Bler. U dva tri maha je rekao, vrlo izričito, da Bosna kao cjelovita država, mora opstati i da Britanija u potpunosti stoji iza toga. Četvrti faktor su promjene u našem okruženju koje slijede i

one se kreću u povoljnom smjeru. Hrvatska će postati demokratska zemlja, a demokratska Hrvatska će podržavati cjelovitu Bosnu. Što se tiče Srbije, ona će se po mom mišljenju još dugo baviti sama sobom, neće se moći baviti Bosnom. Dakle, Hrvatske neće htjeti, a Srbija neće moći podrivati Bosnu. Peti faktor su integracije, u koje će Bosna ući. Mi smo odlučni da idemo u tom pravcu. Prvo u Vijeće Evrope, pa Partnerstvo za mir, itd. I nama se to obećava, niko nam to ne obećava iz straha. Obećavaju nam da bi nas ohrabрили da na tom putu istrajemo. Dakle, tih pet faktora djeluje u pravcu očuvanja bosanske države. Da ponovim, Dejton, većina Bosanaca, većina svijeta, promjene u okruženju i konačno ulazak u evropske integracije.

Pitaju me, također, ko su glavni saveznici Bosne u ovoj historijskoj borbi za opstanak. - Bez dileme, to je Amerika. Možda ima zemalja koje nas više vole od Amerike, ali ne mogu nam pomoći. Ima ih koje bi mogle, ali neće. Samo Amerika i hoće i može.

Na kraju, za ovo održanje od najveće važnosti je da naš narod ima jedan moralni princip koji slijedi bezuslovno. Pokazalo se da je u istoriji svaka moć, politička, vojna, ekonomska i svaka druga, uvijek počinjala kao moralni uspon, i svaki poraz počinjao kao moralni pad. U historiji su opstali samo narodi koji su poštivali neki moralni princip, ma kako on glasio. Moralna načela mogu da se razlikuju, ali uvijek su dobra stvar, uvijek govore o nekom dobru. Naš moralni princip treba da bude tolerancija, to je u tradiciji našeg naroda. Tolerancija nije ravnodušnost kao što to neki ljudi misle. Naprotiv, ona je snažno i duboko opredjeljenje i sadrži dvoje: to je ljubav za svoje i poštovanje za tuđe. Dakle, volimo svoje i poštujemo tuđe. Držimo se tog načela u Bosni i mi ćemo pobijediti.

Ima još jedan faktor koji bih u ovoj prilici iznio. Pred našim očima raste, stasava jedna izvanredna generacija Bosanaca. Mi imamo najbolju djecu na svijetu, mi imamo najbolje vojnike na svijetu. I vrijeme i prostor su neobični. Bosna je u nekom smislu rijetka zemlja, zemlja na razmeđu svijetova. A generacija o kojoj govorim radja se i raste koncem 20. vijeka, i to za vrijeme

i nakon strašnog rata. Ta djeca su prošla kroz džehenem, ona su upoznala glad i umiranje i gledala smrti u oči. Ta djeca su naš veliki adut za budućnost, moramo voditi računa o njima.

Dakle, taj moralni princip i ta garancija - i tada nema sile koja nas može pobijediti.

Toliko sam danas htio reći i hvala vam na strpljenju.

INTRODUCTORY REMARK

The speech delivered by Mr. Alija Izetbegović, Chairman of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina at the round-table discussion of the Congress of Bosniak Intellectuals on November 29, 1997, addressed a wide scope of issues, which were mentioned in letters sent by citizens who are first of all interested in the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as other numerous issues and problems. This was truly an opportunity to get answers from a competent personality, who is the first participant of historic events in this region in the past several years. The participation by Mr. Izetbegović at the round-table aroused considerable interest among the public, which was proven by the large number of visitors who filled two largest halls in the Army Home in Sarajevo, which forced the Obala Art Center to broadcast the address in the other hall.

The issue was the war and peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina as an issue which attracts attention of both domestic and international public. How did the war happen, could it have been avoided, could the bloodshed and mass suffering be prevented? How was the peace achieved, what does such a peace full of compromises and concessions brings, is peace possible after genocide and aggression? What is the worst side of the Dayton accords and what is it's best side? The Dayton document is an expression of times and circumstances in which we lived then, and if it is consistently implemented it will be a favorable agreement, Mr. Izetbegović stressed. Besides all problems that we do have, his conclusion was an optimistic one: "We have the best children in the world, we have the best soldiers in the world. The generation about which I speak is being born and is growing up at the end of the 20th century, both during and after the terrible war. These children have gone through hell, they have been acquainted with hunger and death, which they stared in the eye. These children are our major trunk-card for the future, we must take care of them".

The part of the speech about media has caused a dispute and was not well received in the media he mentioned. We would say that this is also part of the efforts in the democratization of the Bosnian Herzegovinian society and in raising the issue of responsibility for public word.

By Arif Zulić

WAR AND PEACE IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

SPEECH DELIVERED AT TRIBUNE OF THE
COUNCIL OF BOSNIAK INTELLECTUALS

Sarajevo - 29 November, 1997

Verbal Presentation

Ladies and Gentlemen,
Dear Friends,

Firstly, I would like to thank you for such a large attendance. I consider it your recognition and support to me.

This is not going to be a classical lecture. In fact, this lecture is a result of my attempt to reply to some questions posed in the letters I was receiving. Namely, I received thousands of letters since I have taken up this duty. I read those recently and decided to give answers to some questions which, in my opinion, have a general meaning, which do not relate to an individual or local problem. Topics - war and peace in Bosnia - is a bit pretentious, for, of course, as you will see, I do not either pretend or think that it would be possible in some 40-45 minutes, as much as I have at disposal, to give an analytical answer to such a complex question. I shall try to give some observations on that, some observations of my own, I think I will disclose perhaps some facts, to date not yet known, show, as we would say, dark side of the moon. That what was not seen and what was less known to the public.

Before giving answers, I could give an observation which, perhaps, may be interesting to you. Firstly, when reading the letters, I noted an enormous variety of questions reflecting differences in our views and great interest of people. There were even questions about Spanish civil war, as well as, for example,

about the recent feuilleton about Tito. Somebody asked for my opinion about the feuilleton, whether that what was written was correct, etc. etc. Naturally, the most frequent were questions concerning our reality, our presence, and particularly questions which I shall be answering today. How did it come to the war in Bosnia, then how the peace was concluded, and why it is such as it is. Then, further, particularly during the recent time, there were many questions about crimes committed by Bosnian Army, or better to say committed by soldiers of Bosnian Army, and also questions about media. I received many letters commenting media informing about various problems in Bosnia, about media presentation of the problems. Further, a very frequent question was how and why we believe that Bosnia will survive. Do you believe or, if yes, why do you believe that Bosnia will survive. Further, who are main allies of Bosnia, also there was a question, I received that letter yesterday, since you are going to deliver a speech, will you give some recommendations ,etc.

I would like to point out a characteristic feature which could be interesting, which reflects the state of spirit in the country, and this characteristic feature is that a large number of these letters, in fact almost one half of them, was written by women, an interesting fact showing interest of women in social and political problems of the country.

I shall start from the beginning.

The first group of the questions, I said, relates to situation in Bosnia just before the war. First of all, to three matters, breakdown of Yugoslavia, i.e. circumstances under which Yugoslavia was disintegrated, then elections in 1990, and establishment of the first government.

There was some polemics, and surely you must remember recent polemics on TV about breakdown of Yugoslavia. I would like to say here, to remind you, that we did not work on breakdown of Yugoslavia. That was not our aim. Everything shows a peaceful politics of our government, a peaceful politics from the very start of Yugoslav crisis to date. Anyhow, I am often

criticized for my saying: discuss whenever possible, wage war if you have to. I do not give up the saying, it is true that I used to say that, and not only once, but on several occasions. Consequently, we tried to preserve Yugoslavia, however to reconstruct her at the same time. If you read press from that time, you will read about our great efforts which lasted throughout the whole of 1991. One of the plans, if you recall, was named by Gligorov and me, and it advocated a confederate Yugoslavia, in fact Yugoslavia which would guarantee freedom and equality for people. In the end, it appeared that Yugoslavia could have not been saved since she could not solve two main problems. Namely, she could not solve problems of freedom, could not give up communist legacy and others, could not give up hegemony, Serb hegemony. Those were two diseases which were eating Yugoslavia, and because of which she disappeared from the history stage. That proved to be one irreparable structure despite of all efforts we made. I mention our efforts since they, though unsuccessful, should be known of, and also since they show that we were very responsible persons. We knew that breakdown of Yugoslavia could jeopardize Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly Bosniak population in her. On the other hand, Bosniak people lived on the other side of the Drina river, and further down to the south, as well as in large numbers in Zagreb, and in other parts. It was in our interest to preserve that country, of course not under any conditions, but under conditions that would ensure freedom and equality of people. Unfortunately, every mentioning of equality was offense for Serbs. That did not succeed, and when something in history is over, there is nothing to grieve for, I always remember Hegel's saying: everything that failed in history, failed for a good reason. History is a judge who cannot be bribed, and if something failed, it had to fail. Yugoslavia such as she was could have not been saved.

As for the communist system, it was globally breaking down, it disappeared in the Soviet Union, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Bulgaria. Consequently, it experienced, so to say, a glo-

bal defeat, so that not even Yugoslavia as a socialist country, though, in a way, a specific country, she could have not survived.

This would be the first part of my toady's lecture, i.e. my response to a question put in one of letters, where I was asked about our relation in regard to Yugoslavia, for there were many such questions. This what I am speaking about now concerns 1991 and our efforts to find some solution, for without it roof over our heads would collapse. In 1991, a short war broke out in Slovenia, and then longer and bloodier in Croatia, and by the end of 1991 Slovenia and Croatia finally pulled out from Yugoslavia. That was time when Slovenia and Croatia were on stage as independent countries, and the rest of Yugoslavia. Bosnia and Herzegovina was suddenly on a crossroads. That was the critical moment. There were only two roads. One, leading Bosnia to the rump Yugoslavia with Serbia and Montenegro, and the other was to declare independence. There was no third possibility. Both of the roads were dangerous for Bosniak people and Bosnia and Herzegovina as a state, both of them contained a danger of defeat, in fact, either moral, or physical, or combined.

I said we had possibility to choose one of the two roads. However, it is disputable whether there was a choice and whether the choice really existed. Could we have stayed in the rump Yugoslavia? I think that we could have not, even had Bosnian people leadership decided to do so, I think that would have been decision which could had not been materialized. Bosniak people was refusing the rump Yugoslavia. I remember, when during that summer, in my already mentioned efforts to reconstruct Yugoslavia, only my mentioning that B&H could, perhaps, in the future Yugoslavia, because of military problem, have somewhat specific form of a closer link with Serbia, initiated true upraise of people. They wrote a graphite on one place, I fear it is still there, Alija - Serb. Consequently, idea of staying only with Serbs and Montenegro in the rump Yugoslavia was not acceptable, and people, most probably, somehow instinc-

tively felt what that could have meant. And since there are no experiments in history, today we can only guess what could have happened. That could have not saved us from the war. JNA would then decide to fight for Croatia and Slovenia, the war would continue, since Serbs would believe they could preserve Yugoslavia where JNA would be the main arbitrator for a long period of time. Most probably, we would be mobilized to fight to preserve such a Yugoslavia. Our boys would have been killed on Croat ; and may be Albanian, battlefields. We would have been called to crush plots in connection with that. Therefore, I am not sure that we would have saved us from great misfortunes even had we decided to stay in the rump Yugoslavia.

I would like to remind you that during the crises our slogan was: " We accept any Yugoslavia with both Croatia and Serbia, we do not accept any Yugoslavia without any one of them ". After Croatia left Yugoslavia that was not possible. Consequently, we had to go for our independence. Also, we did not lull with false hopes that declaration of independence would go without problems, but we had no choice. We were aware that Serbs throughout B&H were provided arms, we knew how many arms was in our possession. We had little. To some most optimistic estimates, at the moment of declaration of independence, we had, perhaps, twenty thousand rifles including also reserve police, which was mobilized, Patriotic League, Green Berets, and against us in B&H we had eight corpses of Yugoslav National Army consisting of 75 thousand troops armed up to their teeth, including tanks, aircraft, etc. It was not long ago, you all remember that time, you remember Sarajevo in May 1992. However, in my opinion, we had no choice, even now there are some critics, wise heads, I do not know how to call them, who say that we should have not declared our independence, considering that we should have joined the rump Yugoslavia. Nobody said that in public, for it would be very difficult to defend that idea. I discussed with many from the opposition, and when I asked them, well, it is true that declaration of inde-

pendence carried a risk, but what were we supposed to do, they never gave a reasonable and clear answer to the question. To my great surprise, one of our intellectual, I do not know whether he is a member of the Council or not, one old man - 80 years old, blame it on his senility, recently said that we should have stayed in the rump Yugoslavia, that would be good for us, that we started the war, etc., consequently, he said all that which is approximately amnestying Karadzic and Milosevic. He said many other things, I had impression, to say truth, that the devil himself was sitting on his shoulder and whispering into his ear what to say because things he was saying were more and more worse and inconceivable. To say truth, I was shocked, however I can pay tribute to the man, though I do not absolutely agree with him, for at least he was sincere and finally said - yes -, we should have stayed in the rump Yugoslavia. Nobody earlier had courage to say that, for it is known what that means, the people suspects what would have been happening had we perchance done that. You can see for yourselves that what is currently happening in Yugoslavia. Montenegro - where many people consider themselves Serbs, sharing the same confession and, if you want, similar culture, is in absolutely subordinated position to Serbia. Serbs possess a certain mentality of superiority, a wrong feeling that they are a mission nation, that they are the strongest nation. They want to be a spine of every country in the region, and I think that they possess an inherent incapability of recognizing equality of other nations. You can see the situation with Montenegro, with people who have established federation with Yugoslavia. Now, you can imagine position of Moslems, or, as they rather say, Turks, i.e. historic leftovers which should be cleansed from here, who are, to their opinion, destabilizing factor on the Balkans - we are talking here, of course, about Bosnian Moslems etc. You can assume what would have been happening.

Of course, these are, let's say, assumptions. That what happened actually latter on - that was war. I must confess, though I suspected a war - sometimes I used to say - there will be no

war, and therefore I am continuously being reproached for that, however that reply of mine, which was just such, had intention to put people at rest since the people was already, with a good reason, in panics. Our defense did not depend on that - whether I said to the people there would be war or not, since statement of that kind, at that moment, could have only speeded up misfortune, our defense depended on that what I was doing to ensure it. And we did very much, as much as we could in those conditions. We established National Council of Defense and Patriotic League, we were trying to arm the people, as much as was possible. However, I must confess that I did not expect the genocide. After 40 years of the former government and that what the government was speaking, and it was speaking about brotherhood and unity, was speaking about equality, and particularly about the second. Therefore, I did not expect Yugoslav Army to accept its transformation into Serb army, and in such a short period of time. Suddenly, it took off its garments - and beneath was pure Serb army. Just before outbreak of the war, I flew for Skopje or for Ohrid, today I do not remember exactly, I know that Gligorov was there, to meet general Adzic. I said to him: "Do it, appoint several Moslem generals to be commanders in B&H. Do it if you want us to save the country". He openly responded that that was not possible. "You know", said Adzic, "Majority of the Army are Serbs. It is out of thinking to have Moslems as commanders in the Army. I have to say you this, Mr. Izetbegovic." The situation was such. I think that this statement can be found in "Oslobodzenje". That's why I ask those who are criticizing: "What were we supposed to do in such a situation?" I would like to hear their answer.

The second question put in the letters relates to 1990 elections, establishment of government, etc.... Even now we can hear statements that in 1990 SDA made a coalition government with SDS and HDZ, and that the coalition was not good. That resulted in disintegration of the country, etc.

To answer the question, we have to go seven years back, to the end of 1990. We had the first multi-party elections in our country. Parties - winners were known: what were we to do in such a situation. We did not have majority in the Assembly, even if we had majority, should we outvote others. They say: you should have not made coalition with SDS. Perhaps. Now, there is a question what would then happen? War would happen, as it happened, but SDS would have an argument, a very clear argument. These Bosniaks are creating a minority government, ignoring will of Serb nation, Serb nation does not want to live in such a Bosnia, they want to dominate, we have to defend ourselves, and so on. Had we established a government only with HDZ, a new NDH would have been established, a kind of Croat-Bosnian union against Serbs, etc. so that the only one logical solution was to try to establish a common government with parties to which Serbs and Croats gave their votes. That was the only thing we could do, and we did it. To my question, which I very often put in my discussions with the opposition, what other thing we should have done, they never knew to give a reply, since other reply does not exist at all. Only with parties which at that time, evidently, represented Serb and Croat nations, we could build up a common government and in that way try, on basis of election results, to save B&H. At that time that seemed to be the correct formula, and it would have been had SDS not been that what it actually was, had it been that what it had declared at its founding congress held in Sarajevo. Latter on, SDS proved to be a chauvinist power, exponent of plans of the Greater Serbia and, as you know, felt that it could, since the former Army took its side. And SDS decided to materialize the Greater Serbia plan, to be a factor of achievement of that plan, and it started out to break Bosnia. On 6 April 1991 Bosnia was recognized, and the war started one day before that date, on 5 April in the afternoon, by bombing of Sarajevo, as soon as decision on recognition of B&H was become known. For it is obvious that from diplomatic sources they got information that B&H would be formally recognised

tomorrow morning, and they set out to attack. Consequently, these are my answers concerning our relations to Yugoslavia, our situation, recognition of our independence, why it happened, and why we made a coalition government with SDS and HDZ. I am ready to answer some of your questions, if any in that respect.

I received a large number of questions concerning peace, focusing on that why is peace such as it is. At the beginning of the lecture I said that we were negotiating all the time while the war was going on, in our search for peace. Some are reproaching me for my readiness to negotiate. But my reply is: yes, we were negotiating, however, at the same time, we were strengthening our defense. Of course, I have for this a very clear proof - that is our Army. We had been over all that time, while negotiating till the Dayton Agreement, strengthening our army. And finally, when the Dayton Agreement was concluded, we had over 200 thousand troops, not exactly all of them armed, we had between 100 and 120 thousand rifles, but since our soldiers were replacing one another at the front leaving rifles when going home, meaning that practically all soldiers in the front were armed. Consequently, we had some 120 thousands rifles, and we had over 2300 artillery pieces. I do not know exact number of tanks, but we had them too, as well as a certain number of choppers. Simultaneously with the negotiations, we were strengthening our defense, and that resulted in army which, at that time, was a power which had to be respected on the Balkans. Thus we created the so-called miracle of the Balkans resistance, and this is not a figure of speech, this is a reality. I believe that that very Army made it finally possible for Bosnia, and our people, to become a factor without which nothing in the region will be possible to solve. Thanks to the fact that we created the army, I was one of the signatories to the Dayton Agreement. I would like to remind you of the Dayton scene: Milosevic-Izetbegovic-Tudjman. Only three of us, nobody else. Otherwise, nobody would have asked us about anything, they would have decided without us. They had to recog-

nize existence of a factor called Bosnia, Bosniaks, Bosnian Army, and thanks to that, practically for the first time in history in the past several centuries, Bosniaks were directly deciding on their destiny. Did we make the best decision, could we have made another decision, I will give you some facts on that, to judge for yourselves.

Consequently, writer of one letter asked why I was negotiating. Well, because I considered that our political position, since our political advantages in every moment of the war were stronger than our military advantages. Our legal, moral and political advantages were stronger and, therefore, should have been used and not left aside.

The Dayton Agreement is a voluminous, but general, document, it is expression of time and circumstances we were in at that time, in which, may be, we are even now. However, I would say that the main deficiency is not only wording of the Agreement. Let us suppose that this Agreement is being consistently implemented. Would it be a favorable Agreement for us? I think it would be. That what is not good is that it is being inconsistently and slowly implemented. In spite of a certain progress in return of refugees, the key Annex 7 is not being implemented, and exactly this Annex was our main motive to conclude the Dayton Agreement. Our main hope for Bosnia is linked to Annex 7. We requested, and they agreed, the world agreed and signed that the refugees would return to their homes. If refugees return to their homes, there would be no such Bosnia which they had in mind, here I mean Serb side in Bosnia, there would be again a mixed, multiethnic Bosnia. That would not be Republika Srpska, for if Bosniaks and Croats return to Republika Srpska, almost half of her population would be non Serb population. We are still believing in, and working on return of people, if not all of them, but majority of them at least, and that would be a new factor in that Republika Srpska. Consequently, Bosnia will continue to exist.

Another question was: "Mr. President, what is, to your opinion, the best in the Dayton Agreement, and what the worst?" - I could answer: the best is Article I of the Dayton Constitution of B&H saying: "Bosnia and Herzegovina shall continue its legal existence as an internationally recognized state under name of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with all the rights of a state, and within its internationally recognized borders". This is a key provision and the first and the most important article of the Constitution of B&H, i.e of Annex IV of the Dayton Agreement. The greatest deficiency of the Dayton Agreement is possibility of blockade of institutions, and that is very much present currently. This advantage and deficiency of the Agreement are waging a silent war, and destiny of Bosnia depends on the outcome of the silent but dangerous war.

What I personally think about the Dayton Agreement, I gave my opinion immediately upon the initialing in Dayton on 21 December, 1995. I remember very well the last part of that short speech. I shall cite it word for word: "This is not a just peace, however it is more just then continuation of the war. In situation such as it is, in the world such as it is, a better peace could have not been reached God is our witness that we did all in our power to make injustice for our country and our people as little as possible". This is what I said. Even now, I think the same about the Agreement. When I returned to Sarajevo, I said to journalists that possibility of blockade is the main deficiency of the Agreement. That is danger for institutions, common institutions through which the state exercises its functions, to be blocked.

And now, why the Agreement is such as it is, I will tell you four-five events more-or-less not known, and which can help to partially answer this question. I shall tell them as I remember them.

Peace negotiations, which resulted in signature of the Dayton Agreement, did not commence on 1 November 1995, and did not lasted for 20 days, as it is usually thought. In fact, they commenced on 12 August 1995 when Mr. Holbrooke arrived

here. My first discussions, after welcome words, were as follows: he informed me that he came with full authorities of President Clinton and that America would implement the Agreement if it would be reached. That was exactly one month after Srebrenica tragedy. I said that we were fully ready for a just peace. After that he put a clear question, I cite it as I remember it: "To be able to start my mission, I would ask you to tell me: you can chose between two possibilities, between two options. Do you want a unified but decentralized state, or do you want your own Bosniak state which will be firm and strong, but only on part of current B&H?" That question was put in such a way. Almost without any hesitation, I responded: "The first possibility". Meaning, a unified, even if somewhat loose and decentralized, state. I realized that it was not possible to obtain a unified and centralized state. But my reply to Mr. Holbrooke was such on that 12 August 1995. May be it would be good to tell you the end of the story, i.e. how the Dayton negotiations, almost four months later, i.e. on 20 and 21 November 1995, were completed. That could perhaps illustrate both situation and atmosphere at that time. After tense relations which lasted for days, in which three sides were negotiating, when you agreed something with one side and that was not acceptable for the third side and so on, issue of Brčko remained unsolved, and some excess territory which, according to the maps, was still in our possession. Milosevic said that he would not accept any agreement which would not respect Contact Group plan on 49:51 per cent distribution of territory. Since this percentage was a condition of all negotiations, and was generally accepted, we could not, of course, refuse the request. I would like to remind you that we all, as well as our Assembly, accepted the plan of the Contact Group as the basis of negotiations. Almost before midnight, on 20 November, Secretary of State, Mr. Christopher comes to my room, refuses to sit down, says we have no time, we are short of time, and adds: you must return to Serbs one and a half per cent of territory you have over 51%, and you must return them Brcko. He requested reply within one

hour. Said good-bye and left. I said to two persons, Mr. Sacibegovic and Mr. Cukle, to try to find that one and a half per cent, but so that we return territories which were not under our military control. They worked very hard and taking here and there small pieces, like a housewife cutting off small pieces of dough, collected one per cent, but the rest 0,50% they were not able to find for otherwise they would have to take parts of territory under control of our army always regained with heavy fighting. As regards Brcko, that, of course, we could not accept. I sent Mr. Sacirbegovic to go to their headquarters, it was in the neighboring building, and to give them answer reading as follows: we give you one per cent of territory, but we do not give Brcko. After half of an hour later Secretary Christopher came to my room and brought a letter for me to sign it reading that the negotiations failed, that they were terminated. That was in night 20 to 21 November 1995, little before or little after midnight. I read the letter, signed it and, to say truth, for the first time in the past five-six days went calmly to bed and slept deeply. It is strange, I have to say, I felt always better when I refused something then when I accepted something. The public accepts easier that what is refused then that what is accepted, though accepting was the only productive thing. That so-called NO system, which is a rather common one, as the most easy one, usually does not lead to anything. That what was done was achieved by means of a positive position. However, at that moment, we really reached the frontier of that what could have been done for peace. I could not return to people with news that Brcko was given over. Unfortunately, the war would continue, however such a peace could not be accepted. I gave instruction for departure tomorrow, on 21 November, at 9 a.m. However, tomorrow at about 8 a.m. a representative of Mr. Christopher came and said that the Secretary would like to come to see me. I said he could come immediately. Obviously, something strange was happening. Before that, Mr. Sacirbegovic informed me that, during that night, there were no news about termination of the negotiations, what would be normal, for there

was a standard practice for the portparol of the White House or Secretariat of the State to inform, every two-three hours, on what was happening. However, that night there were no news on failure of the negotiations. Only later, I shall understand why it was so. Mr. Christopher came accompanied by Mr. Holbrooke. He refused to sit down, and while standing at the doorway he said: "Do you accept Brcko arbitration". Without hesitating I replied: "Yes", for I had earlier offered the solution realizing that negotiations could fail because of Brcko. Well, I was telling to myself, if we solved so many issues here, why have we to continue the war only because of that single unresolved issue. Let us leave it aside for the time being, perhaps later on we shall be more clever and so on. Consequently, already after 10 November, I proposed Brcko arbitration. However, Serbs refused. Milosevic believed he could get Brcko if he tried hard. And he tried hard. When he saw that we signed termination of the negotiations, he changed his mind. I can only imagine what was happening there during that night: he was told that the negotiations failed, that he was responsible for the termination, because of his persistence to get Brcko, and then arbitration idea came out, and they offered it. When I said that I accepted, Mr. Holbrooke nodded his head and in a quiet voice said something to Mr. Christopher, and they left that very moment. Later on, from some Mr. Holbrooke's statements I realized that he said to him: "Let's go quickly from here". Probably, they were afraid I would say: "Yes, I accept the arbitration", and then: "but", though I did not have intention to say that. Let's go quickly, consequently, from here. In one-two hours it was communicated that the negotiations were completed successfully and that the peace was concluded. President Clinton appeared in front of the White House and announced that agreement on peace was reached, that there would be no more war in Bosnia, that new future was ahead of Bosnia, etc. We initialed that agreement some time early in the afternoon American time, i.e. rather late that night our time.

There is another event which can give more information on the issue . In August 1995, through French Embassy, I received from Mr. Shirak an invitation to pay an official visit to France on 29 August. I set out in the evening on 27th and overnighed in Mostar intending to fly by chopper from Jablanica for Split at noon. Just when I was getting ready, it was 28 August some time after 11 a.m., I received an information that a shell hit Markale, that 50-60 persons were killed and that many were wounded, and I decided to return to Sarajevo. I thought what use of going anywhere when all that was happening and that there was no reaction, and from previous bad experience, to say truth, I did not expect any reaction. I considered that would again end only with condemnations which have no effect, and I decided to cancel my trip. Among others, Mr. Safa Orucevic was a member of our delegation. Safa was trying to persuade me to go and to explain to the world what was being done to us. No use of returning to Sarajevo and crying. We arrived to France with a great delay, we were waited for until 3 p.m., and we arrived some time at twilight. The nex day I had discussions with Mr. Shirak. And, of course, the first thing I wanted to discuss was the issue of reaction to the yesterday's massacre. He said very clearly to me: " Mr. Izetbegovic you have my YES for that. France is for intervention in the instance. France has a fully clear position. Americans slightly hesitate, press on them". His reply was worded like that . However, there is another circumstance. As soon as I arrived to Paris, Mr. Holbrooke informed me that he was in Paris too, and that he wanted us to have discussions. I responded that there would be no peace negotiations because of Markale massacre and Mr. Shirak's statement about hesitation of Americans. He rang up again in the afternoon, I refused again . That happened on 29 August, 1995. That evening, I had a meeting in a French club where I delivered a speech to a group of their intellectuals. After the meeting, I returned to the hotel, we were expected to return the next day. As it was raining, I proposed to dress sportsmenlike and go for a short walk. We went out, it was about 10 p.m. At 10.30

p.m. some persons approached us, they said they were from the American Embassy and that I and my colleagues were invited by the Ambassador for a supper in the American Embassy. That was Mrs. Hariman, a wonderful, noble lady, a great friend of Bosnia, widow of a famous American diplomat, Mr. Averel Hariman. I guessed that was connected with continuation of negotiations which I did not in any case want to continue. I said that I unfortunately could not join the lady for supper, also I was not properly dressed for that occasion, and I thanked the lady for the invitation. After that, the man added: "Mrs. Ambassador has also a very important news for you ". Then, of course, I changed my decision. We set out toward Embassy and entered the yard. Mrs. Hariman waited for us at the residence doorway and welcomed us kindly. The lady lead us to a large room, larger than this one, Mr. Holbrooke was sitting in the right corner at the telephone and discussed something. Then, he gave me a sign to come to him, showing to the telephone receiver. "There is somebody who wants to talk to you". Mr. Talbot, Assistant to the Secretary of State, Mr. Christopher, was on the other side of wire. He said something like this: "I know you have dilemmas regarding the negotiations, however my proposal to you would be to continue your discussions with Mr. Holbrooke, and the action will follow". "What action?" - I asked. To date, there were several actions, surely you remember that famous bombing of an old tank. Mr. Talbot responds: "This time, action will be a serious massive action". - "And when it will happen" - I asked. He said: " I myself do not know exactly, but I know it will be very soon". "O.K." - I said - "I shall continue negotiations, I keep you for your word". And then he added that key sentence because of which I am telling you all this: " Only, Mr. Izetbegovic, you should know, this what is going to follow you will not be able to use for continuation of the war, you can use it only for peace, not for continuation of war". I said that I agreed with that. He could have not expected any other reply from me, however, in negotiations that sentence was very often repeated, as well as that of Mr. Holbrooke about

decentralized state. We had that supper and returned to the hotel some time after 1 a.m. I went to bed thinking that real action would finally follow. And then , early next morning, at about six a.m., they were knocking on my door saying quite loud: " President, there is action down there this morning, massive bombing of Serb positions around Sarajevo and around Tuzla and so on". That was in the morning on 30 August. In light of discussions I had with President Shirak, I decided to visit him for 15 minutes and to thank him, since I knew that he also deserved credit for the action. I asked to be received, and I was received immediately. I am mentioning this because of a very interesting detail. When we left Mr. Shirak's residence, a large group of journalists was waiting for us. Mr. Shirak told me: " Journalists are waiting to hear your comment on the bombing. I would ask you not to give a warmongering statement, I would ask you to give a statement talking about peace and so on". I went out and said to the journalists: " These bombs are bombs for peace, they are not for war. These bombs are for peace". When parting, he said that the statement was good and so on. But I want to say that all that what was undertaken could have not be used for continuation of the war, and this is explaining why we did not continue our offensives in October 1995. Further, there are several significant details too. On 10 September, we cut through the front near Vozuca and joined the Second and the Third Corpses. We advanced strongly in Krajina, and then their counter offensive near Kljuc followed, so that our front up there bacame unstable for a moment. On 5 October 1995 we concluded a cease-fire, however we continued to advance on 6, 7 and 8 October. At that time, Americans sent their first warning to me, you signed, but you continued war actions, you must not continue war actions, etc. Of course, we were trying to liberate Prijedor, Bosanski Novi , if possible, however without success. American Ambassador visited me on 11 or 12 October and said: " If further actions are not stopped, your side would be bombed this time. We shall bomb your troops, your forces". I realized that we could not go on with our

actions, and sent General Delic up there to Krajina to explain the situation to Dudakovic. He went to Krajina and stopped fighting. That was a must, but I think that in the last moment we managed to liberate Sanski Most. That happened on 11 or 12 October.

Perhaps, I should mention here another important circumstance which had a strong effect on the negotiations. And that is statement of President Clinton delivered on 5 November 1995, during the first days of the negotiations, when he said that America, provided peace would be concluded, would participate military in its implementation. Of course, that was a very important statement which was urging us to persist in finding a solution by any means, since, at the same time, he stated also: " This is the last chance, if it fails, America will pull out from all". During the negotiations, on several occasions, we were told that that was the last chance and that it should not be wasted. As you know, we did not waste it, and should not regret. We are a small nation, and there was too much killing. I used the opportunity to tell you some things to better understand our situation. I believe that Bosnia will survive, and how and why I believe it, I will explain in more detail later on.

The next group of questions, I was asked recently, relates to crimes attributed to Bosnian army. Firstly, let me say - unfortunately there were crimes, but how many, somebody will be angry when hearing the word - how many. A crime is a crime, whether one or a thousand of persons were killed. The Koran itself says, let me remind you, one of the most sublime sentences of the Holy Book reads: " To kill a man is the same as to kill the whole world". This is explicitly said in Koran, and not by chance. This is a message saying, when a crime is committed, there is no counting. Well, of course, in religious and moral sense there is no counting. But, in political and practical sense it exists. For, from the moral point of view it is not important whether one man or 50 persons were killed. From the political point of view it is important, very important, Why? - I shall try to explain. There is a justified question, when events which

deserve every condemnation occurred, were they politics of our civil or military leadership. You all know very well, that was not our politics. However, the world must not necessarily believe it. Well, that number reveals whether it was our politics or incidental cases. If over almost four years long war 100 civilians were killed, that could be incidental cases, but if 10 thousand persons were killed than that could be a plan. Of course, investigation will show, there is an investigation going on. Unfortunately, when Grabovica is concerned, the investigation was terminated, and then was initiated by magazines, this is the truth, and they were correct to that extent, regardless of the fact that objectivity limits were violated later on. Manner in which they are treating the issue now, is not, in my opinion, objective, also it is not very much patriotic either. According to that what can be learned from various documents and protocols, soldiers of our army might be responsible for maximum one hundred crimes, when everything is summed up, in Kazani, Grabovica, and in Celebici tunnel, and may be against Croats near Bugojno. However the last has not yet been proved, and when all that is summed up, that gives one hundred persons, and that is hundred times less than that what was done to Bosniak people, some say even thousand times less. We had a long front, long one thousand two hundred kilometers, and at that front one thousand two hundred days of war. If you multiply the two figures, you will see how much effort was necessary to prevent crimes at such a long line in such a long period of time. That could only be result of a really correct position of politics and army leaders toward the issue. Each of our soldier possessed a codex describing what was allowed, as well as, including excerpts from international conventions. I think, you will recall that in all occasions we warned our people to be careful of their deeds, that it was not to us to prosecute civilians and so on. They were thought in that sense, and we succeeded in that effort, however, unfortunately, not completely, and not in all places. Here in Sarajevo we had a case, as you know, of renegade units. Some of you who have a better memory will

recall situation in the city in July 1993 when some units attacked police, captured a number of policemen, and so on. I want to point out that, at that time, no person informed us, I state this with full responsibility, of existence of any crimes in Sarajevo. I did not have time to read today's newspapers, but I was told that they write that General Divjak stated that he sent me a letter in which Kazani was mentioned. I have that letter, and it does not mention either Kazani or genocide killings. That letter mentions harassing of people, even some killings, but it can clearly be seen that it were not only Serbs, but also Bosniaks and Croats, since the letter contains names of all three nations. Consequently, it is true that some of our soldiers, or units, were harassing the people, but that was not a genocide. There were killings theft motivated, very often with a revenge as a motive. However, victims were of different nations, and that motivated our court not to qualify them as war crimes, as a genocide, but only as homicides. Why did they pass such sentences, naturally, judges will explain. The judges are alive, as well as the prosecutor and investigation authorities, they are all here and will be able to give their judgment on that. As far as I know, the prosecutor was a Serb, as well as a member of the council of judges. However, it is important that we took activities to prevent further self-will. I have to say, with a certain feeling of pride, that the first, who rouse its voice very clearly saying that something should be immediately undertaken since bad things were happening, that it was the Executive Committee of SDA. That communiqué was given from meeting held on 23 October 1993, and it read just as follows:" Starting from obligations and responsibilities of the Party of Democratic Action to strengthen defense capabilities of people of B&H, and considering the current military and security situation in Sarajevo, the Executive Committee of SDA states that in some units of the First Corps of Army of B&H system of control and command has been for a longer time been seriously disturbed and which is directly jeopardizing efficiency of carrying out combat objectives and undermining efforts of the Army of B&H and people

in their difficult struggle against aggressor. Crime and self-will among members of armed force has also developed considerably. Illegal activities and behavior of individuals in some units in Sarajevo have been destroying reputation achieved by the units during heroic defense of the city. Therefore, the Executive Committee of SDA urges the government authorities, particularly the Presidency of B&H and the Headquarters of the Supreme Command of Army of, to consider the situation and undertake measures to establish order and respect of law and in that way to restore confidence of citizens in their army and state. Only organized and well synchronized fight can be successful, and war and war conditions cannot be pretext for self-will and lawlessness". This is how full text of that important document read.

The communiqué was read on the main evening TV news show on 23 October 1995 and in *Oslobodjenje* of 24 October. Military and police action followed on 26 October in the morning hours and lasted that whole day almost till midnight. As you know, Topalovic was killed in that action, several hundreds persons were arrested, they were imprisoned and they were investigated, a large number of them was released due to shortage of evidence, however all who were under suspicion were arrested at that time, those who had evidence against them were convicted. It is not mine to say whether the sentences were mild or not, or should qualification have been different, but I want to say that we, in a famished, tortured and shelled Sarajevo found strength to undertake such a risky action. The tenth brigade, with Musan Topalovic as a commander, held lines up there on Trebevic, from Colina Kapa to Vrbanja bridge. That was a very critical line and very close to the city. Here I have to point out that any satanization of the unit as a whole is not allowed. For, the investigation revealed that only Caco and a narrow circle of his close associates were involved in the crime. The tenth cavalry brigade, which consisted of two to three thousand very devoted troops, is being currently continuously called out. When, on 26 October, the action took place none of them

left the line. They all remained at their posts. Today we cannot allow considering of all who were in the tenth brigade as suspects and co-responsible persons. And this exists. I ask myself: is this introducing of a collective guilt for people. Responsibility should be individual, and it cannot be said that all Serbs are criminals just because Serbs were killing. Responsible are only individual persons who committed killings. This cannot be attributed to the whole units. It cannot be said that the tenth chivalry brigade is a criminal brigade. The tenth brigade honorably defended the city for full three years and many of its soldiers were killed. And finally, it proved its devotion in the critical moment. Anyway, when this issue is involved, investigation authorities are doing their job, and the Hague Tribunal as well. The Hague Tribunal will, as to date, have our full cooperation.

Unfortunately, there is no war without crimes, regardless of who waged it: Germans against French, Americans against Vietnam. Enormous war crimes were committed in the second world war. You cannot control everything. Sometimes you cannot control since units had people with dossiers. Later on, some of them fought for B&H very honestly and with discipline. These are those who in a way redeemed themselves, returned to normal living. However there are persons who then used opportunity, armed and well fed they started to behave violently. There were also mentally sick persons, even that happens, the situation was not normal, while recruiting, in those circumstances, went on without control, without necessary medical and other procedure.

I go now to the next question.

I received a lot of letters on media, many are angry with media reporting just on these crimes, and in general on situation in B&H. I have to say that these letters do not contain serious objections to TV companies, to TV B&H, Hayat, OBN. There are objections to Pale and West Mostar, and quite frequently. There are no objections to newspapers, I mean dailies, and my personal opinion is that daily newspapers in the city perform their function correctly. However, I could not say so for our

magazines which started to race, to exaggerate black sides of the society, particularly when these crimes are involved, they emphasize them, search for and extract worse and worse statements. Firstly, I know that many statements are not correct, and secondly, do you not note that we have here a campaign which seceded completely to shade crimes committed by Cetniks. Nobody is any more mentioning Karadzic, Mladic, Srebrenica. Kazani is being talked about now. They do not care that B&H is loosing her reputation, a deserved reputation. For, if there were any light and law, that was present here. However, articles in the media give a completely different picture. Nobody is any more talking about crimes committed by Cetniks. Now we are equal at least, may be even worse. Since there are no details of Cetniks' crimes, those monstrous details which upset people. Here they are presented, and very often completely fabricated. Besides, here they do not mention incredible and unverified figures. They need news, the fact that Karadzic is a criminal is not a news. The fact that Cetniks committed crimes is not a news anymore. News is that Bosnian army committed crimes, so that something should be written about that. You know a saying: News is not that a dog bit a man, but that a man bit a dog. As for media, people is putting questions to me, and I do not know what to say. There are angry letters saying that they are enemies, that they work for money. Many say that they have proofs that some journalists are doing this for money, that they know who is receiving money for that, and who is ready to write the worst article against B&H for a thousand German Marks. This is what people say to me. I do not know what is there correct, however, I must confess that any one who is not blind or deaf can feel a campaign. A clear campaign against Bosnian government can be felt, against Bosnian army, and a desire to stain Bosnian government at any price. There is a desire to present everything in black and so on. Poverty, crime, lawlessness, struggle for power and so on, and so on are continuously spoken of. Some papers present situation in Bosnia only in that way, there is nothing positive. I shall cite several

"pearl parts" from these articles. These magazines call themselves independent, but my impression is, I may be a little rude, I do not think that they are either independent or professional. Namely, they consider that independence means permanent attacking the government. And as for their professionalism, I would not say that they are professionals, for they are violating the fundamental rules of their profession, and that is to hear the other side as well and verify. They are not following the rule. They publish a raw news without verification, or write, a man says, so and so is said in the corridors, an anonymous official says so and so. This is how unverified stories are being placed. None of them goes to the site to ask: well, mister, we heard so and so, what is the situation. None of them went to see attorneys, judges, investigators to learn what actually happened in that unfortunate Kazani, for there are documents on that. And now those stories about corruption, in fact on financing of some institutions. We find our ways to finance AID, I do not hide that. We do not want to be left without that service, which is, in the end, controlling who comes to the city, who goes where, who works what, for we need that in situation when our borders are porous and when everybody may come into the city. We heard bombs which exploded. We did not hear those which did not and could have exploded. That was prevented by AID. Today, thanks god, we have a peaceful city. Somebody should keep the peace.

And now, here are the "pearl parts" I mentioned earlier. One article reads exactly like this: "In this area nothing happens incidentally, particularly and primarily, it is not incidental that there is not a state, and it is logic that there is neither police nor justice, and since it is so as it is, that is how it is. Criminals and terrorists are doing that what they are doing, since they were intentionally generated by the state and allowed them here to serve as security for big and huge thieves, to protect their part in the private state fraud. They brought killers into this country to protect them and their fraud... etc." This is what was written in one of recently published article. To this article, the govern-

ment brought killers into the country to protect its fraud. There is no state, no police, just thieves, killers and robbers. This is being served to the people. Thanks god, state existed even in the most difficult times. I remember Sarajevo in 1993, at the peak of war activities. My sister lives in Velesici, I used to return from visits to her late in the night, and I lived up there near Hospital. I used to see women going alone at eleven and twelve o'clock in the night. There is no record that they were assaulted. Usually they were medical sisters - nurses going to their duties some time at eleven o'clock, some go to , some return from, I used to see them going without men accompanying them. They were hurrying to their homes or going to work. Car headlights would lit them, and the whole city was in complete darkness. There was no case of attack on them, consequently, state and order existed . This is my message to the author of that article. Evidently, he does not know what it means not to have a state. He is not at all aware of his writing. And as for the general social and economic situation, being presented, by this and similar to him authors, in dark colors, I would like to remind you that we arranged for return of 400 thousand refugees, consequently 400 thousand persons returned to their homes and got accommodation over the past two years. Two hundred thousand of them were displaced persons who were expelled from their homes inside B&H, and approximately the same number of them returned from abroad. While they were sharpening their pens and writing, we were working. While they were fabricating lies, we had to solve problem of how to pay pensions to 190 thousand pensioners. We managed for every village in B&H to have electricity, as well as telephone connection, and TV signal. We repaired houses, found money for all teachers and doctors in the state. You know that there were no salaries, and, today, teachers and doctors can live of their salaries, true, modestly, but they can live. Pensions are not high, I know that, however there are 190 thousand pensioners, as well as 70 thousands disabled persons, and 42 thousand close relatives of killed soldiers receiving pensions too. These funds were to be pro-

vided for without printing new money, so that there is no inflation. Over the two years we managed to repair all schools and all hospitals. They do not see anything of this, they see everywhere only fraud, crime, terrorism and so on, and are persuading people that situation is such. That is reality of Bosnia for them. However, that is not reality of Bosnia, that is a lie about Bosnia. A malicious lie which demoralizes people and undermines reputation of the country. Their blown up and repeated stories about corruption, when foreign donations are concerned, costed this country 200 to 300 million US dollars, for, naturally, as soon as there are stories about corruption, those who provide funds stop everything. Why should they give money to thieves. My mother and I do not want to give money- said Ambassador Crawford - to fill pockets of some thieves in Bosnia. You now that I have established a commission and that the commission has not yet come to any evidence on diversion of donations. This does not mean that there is no fraud of other kind. Of course, it exists, but tell me a country without it. Fraud and death are the only two invincible things.

Recently we initiated an initiative for all government officials, and all those having power to decide upon something, to give statements on state of their property. I consider this idea a very good one, and we all have to do that. We have to say in public what we had before the war, what we have now, to sign that, and if it proves that we were lying we have to bear moral and legal consequences. I consider that a large number of officials will be able to give a fair response to the question.

In 1946, for political reasons, I was sentenced for three years imprisonment, and I was released in spring 1949. Last days of my sentence I spent in a camp at the border with Hungary. Another prisoner, political prisoner too, a poor man, who used to work as a ticket collector in tram. His family lived in Sarajevo. He asked me to give a letter to his wife. He explained to me that his wife was working in a fruit and vegetable shop somewhere between the Czar's Bridge and the Old Market. Already the next day upon my arrival home, I went to find the women.

I found her in one of shops, and, while she was reading the letter, I was viewing the shop. There was nothing in the shop except for 5-6 boxes with beet. It was cold, she and the shop chief were wrapped up in some blankets, since there was no heating in that shop. I asked her: " Well, what are you selling here?" - "This what you can see" - they replied and added that sometimes they had some potatoes, but that immediately created long quays. I remember well, as well as some elder of you present here, there was nothing in Sarajevo in those days, I can even say in those years. Sarajevo seemed poor and empty. There was some, not sufficient, flour, sugar and oil delivered against tickets, and textile also against coupons, for ordinary people, for a large majority of people. So-called stores for ministers existed for the privileged ones. There were three categories of the stores. My sister-in-law worked in one of the stores, under "number 3", so that the situation is well known to me. Military and political top officials were receiving their supplies in "number 1", without any quantity limitations. Those stores were supplied with everything, from pasteurized milk to all types of chocolate. And along with that , prisons were crowded with Informbureau sympathizers and Young Moslems, and those who could not hold their tongues. When all prisons inherited from the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and Ustase were full up, they established additional camp in Cengic Vila - called "Camp 505" - with several thousands of people imprisoned in it. And all this what I am talking about was in 1949, consequently, four years after the war, and the situation did not improve as far as until 1952. That was that "left" justice, social and political, and some contemporary journalists and members of the opposition, spiritual and ideology successors to that "justice" reproach us daily for various shortcomings and injustice. They exist for sure, and should be removed, but in the past year, only one year after the destructive war, Sarajevo looked better that in 1950, under communists, five years after that war. Until 1966, consequently for 21 year, Rankovic was in power, and some welfare and freedom was felt only in 1978-1978, consequently, after more

than 30 years of that rule. But that was also at price of lack of freedom of speech, and with 20 billion foreign debt.

And now back to our media and their half-truths. I shall mention only two recent examples. The first relates Kazanii case, and the second the unfortunate issue of two education programs.

Unfortunately, Kazani case happened, however , our action against those who committed the crimes happened too. The crimes are being pointed out, elaborated in ten variants, there is no word about the action, as if it did not happen at all, and the drama in the city went on for 20 hours, in fact we were fighting our own soldiers, we arrested the head quarter of the tent brigade, defense lines could have been left any moment. Nobody writes about that. There is a crime, but punishment too. If crimes are only being talked about, and not punishment, if it is been ignored, than it is evident that something is bad, that only half truth is said. And as one of writers of letters to me says, exactly that is happening. He writes, Mr. President, only half truths are told because they were paid for , but not the other half . They received money only for that half-truth which puts blame on the government.

The same situation is with the education programs. Minister makes a mistake and, under pressure of the Croats, accepts two programs. We refuse to accept that, at SDA initiative, the Club of the Coalition submits a petition where we say that we do not accept the two programs, that we want one integral program where national particularities would be respected as well. That happened in the Federal Assembly, however the campaign was continuing as if there was no petition at all. By the way, I investigated whether minister's wrong instructions caused any damage, and I found out that, in fact, nothing happened. Two programs existed even before, they exist even now, and that only in that famous "Tent School" near Tesanj. But, they had two programs even before. Director of the famous Tent School separated since he did not want to accept Bosnian program. That is why he set up that tent whose pictures were circulated through-

out the world. And it was said, well you can see for yourselves what this Bosnian government is doing, it does not give the people their education program, and they went in the tent. The pictures circulated and disgraced us. We cannot strike back at every propaganda. Quite opposite happen later. Our director of the school returns those from the tent school, and after that there are pictures showing director who allowed two education programs. And to my great surprise, that Bosniak director, instead of saying that his colleague, deputy Croat, returned because he could not look children freezing in the tent, for blame is not on children, instead of saying that, for that is truth, he said: ask about program those on the top, and his deputy Croat confirmed the same. He had right.

A big pile of letters, these in front of me, contains the following question put in various forms: why do I believe that, in spite of everything, Bosnia will survive as an integral state? My reply would be: I have at least five strong arguments for that. The first argument is the Dayton Agreement. The second argument is that majority of citizens in Bosnia want an integral state. The whole Bosniak people is absolutely for such a state, and Bosniak people is spine of Bosnia, and it will not allow destruction of Bosnia. The third argument for that is the fact that majority of the world is for Bosnia, a vast majority : America, Europe, Islamic world, as well as some so important nations such as Japan and China. I have to point out that we also enjoy a strong support of England which is sometimes accused of playing a double game. Recently, Mr. Blair, Prime Minister, paid a visit to us. On two or three occasions Mr. Blair said, very explicitly, that Bosnia as an integral state has to survive, and that Great Britain is fully committed to that. The fourth argument are current changes in our environment and they are moving in the right direction. Croatia will become a democratic country, and democratic Croatia will support an integral Bosnia. As for Serbia, in my opinion, she will be occupied with herself for a long period of time, she will not be able to occupy herself with Bosnia. Consequently, Croatia will not want, and

Serbia will not be able to undermine Bosnia. The fifth argument are integrations ahead of Bosnia. We are committed to move in that direction. Firstly into the Council of Europe, and then into Partnership for Peace, etc. These integrations are being promised to us, nobody is giving promises for fear. They are giving these promises to encourage us to persist on the way. Consequently, the five factors are acting in the direction of survival of the Bosnian state. Let me repeat them: the Dayton, majority of Bosnian population, majority of the world, changes in the environment, and finally joining European integrations.

Also, some asked who are the main allies of Bosnia in the historic struggle for survival. Without any dilemma, that is America. We may have countries which like us more than Americans, but they cannot help us. Some could, but they do not want. Only America both wants and can.

And finally, the most important for the survival is that our people should have a moral principle to be followed up unconditionally. History proves that every power, political, military, economic and any other, started as a moral rise, and that each defeat started as a moral fall. History proves that only those nations survived which respected a moral principle, regardless of how it read. Moral principles can differ, but they are always positive and strive to something good. Tolerance should be our moral principle, that is traditional of our people. As some think, tolerance is not indifference. On the contrary, it is strong and deep determination and contains two things: one is love for its own and respect of others. Consequently, we love our own and respect others. In Bosnia we follow the principle, and we shall conquer. There is one more factor which I would like to point out to at the moment. Here, in front of our eyes grows an exceptional generation of Bosniaks. Our children are the best children in the world, our soldiers are the best soldiers in the world. They are growing in an unusual time and in a strange environment. In a way, Bosnia is a rare country, a country on crossroads of the worlds. And generation which I am talking about is growing at the end of the twentieth century during and

after the terrible war. These children experienced hell, hunger and dieing, and they looked death into the eyes. We must take great care of the children. They are our big trump for the future. With that moral principle and with such a generation ,I believe, there is no power which could conquer us.

That much for today, and thank you for your patience

Sadržaj

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